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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes within
the Use-of-Force Continuum on taser usage and officer’s perceptions of taser effectiveness.
Tasers have been used by police since the 1970s and their use is increasing as the technology has
improved. Data reveals that tasers are beneficial for controlling non-compliant suspects while
preventing serious injuries and rarely has their use resulted in death. Much of the public
controversy surrounding tasers centers on when and how often officers deploy them. Use of
force data from 890 police citizen encounters during a two-year period was analyzed to examine
how changes in organizational policy have affected taser deployments and how policy changes
have affected taser use. The study’s findings support that after the policy change, the frequency
of taser use by officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers
increased. The frequency and severity of suspect injuries did not change and the numbers of
officers injured in use-of-force encounters also did not change. Survey response data from
officers were compared to archival data, which revealed that while officers perceive an increased
risk of harm to themselves as a result of the organizational policy change that was not supported
in the findings. Officers did not perceive an increased risk of harm to suspects which was
supported in the archival data findings. Officers also expressed a belief that the organizational
change that placed the taser at a higher level on the Use-of-Force Continuum is appropriate for
most use-of-force encounters. This study concludes with future directions and trends for taser use
in law enforcement.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ASP

An expandable metal baton is an impact weapon used to deliver blows to specific
areas of the body to gain compliance from a resisting or noncompliant suspect.
This weapon is issued by the Orlando Police Department.

CED

Conducted energy devices encompass a wide range of weapons that rely on
electrical shock to incapacitate combative and/or noncompliant suspects. These
include stun guns, stun belts, electronic control devices, and tasers.

CN

Chloroacetaphenone, or tear gas, was introduced for police use in the 1960s. Its
principle use was in civil disorders or riots. It is an irritant that produces burning
in the eyes, nose, and throat.

CS

Ortho/Chlorobenzal-Malononitrile is another disabling gas. It came into use
during the 1960s and 1970s. CS gas causes pain in the nose, throat, and chest.

ECD

Electronic control device is a term used by the Orlando Police Department to
describe the taser in their policies and procedures.

LTL

Less-than-lethal weapons are a category of use-of-force weapons, which are
designed to gain compliance from noncompliant subjects without inflicting
serious or lethal injuries.

OC

Oleoresin Capsicum, or OC, is derived from an irritant in cayenne pepper. It is a
bottle propelled by compressed air that is sprayed into the facial area of a
noncompliant subject. This results in mild respiratory distress and temporary loss
of vision.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The issue of police use of force remains a topic of intense debate that requires further
research for criminal justice practitioners and scholars. Police officers are one of the most visible
arms of government, and they are entrusted with substantial authority and discretion (Bittner,
1970; Fyfe, 1988). They are the only members of society legally authorized to take life or inflict
serious injury to preserve order and enforce the law (Bittner, 1970; Reiss, 1971). The public’s
perception of law enforcement’s ability to control crime while maintaining high levels of
accountably and ethical standards is often framed around the use of force by police (Adams et
al., 1999; GAO, 2005, Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; Terrill, 2005).
During the past few decades, several incidents of excessive use of police force have
garnered local, national, and international media attention. These incidents have cast police in a
negative light and have altered the public’s perception of their use of force. Two notable
examples include the 1991 Rodney King incident in Los Angeles and the 1999 shooting death of
Amadou Diallo by New York City police officers (Belotto, 2001; Meyer, 1992). Both of these
incidents galvanized public opinion on when and how much force law enforcement officers
should use when encountering noncompliant or potentially violent suspects.
To address the public’s perception of excessive use of force by officers in non-deadly
force confrontations, many police agencies have adopted a variety of less-than-lethal alternatives
for officers to employ when dealing with noncompliant suspects. The implementation of these
less-than-lethal weapons was designed to provide officers with options to control suspects
without inflicting permanent injury. The infliction of serious injuries to suspects during
encounters with police is often a catalyst for citizen complaints, lawsuits, and increased scrutiny
of police actions.
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One of these alternatives is the conducted energy device (CED), also referred to as an
electronic control weapon (ECW), or a taser (McBride & Tedder, 2005). This type of weapon
has been used by police since the 1970s, but it has recently gained renewed popularity with the
development of a new generation of products. Nationally, a limited number of deaths and injuries
have occurred during taser use (McBride & Tedder, 2005, p.6). While the number of deaths is
small when compared to overall taser uses many of these incidents have generated intense media
coverage (Amnesty International, 1999, 2004). These cases are a clear indication that the lack of
substantive research on the use and effects of taser technology leaves many unanswered
questions for both the police and the public.
Police officers are authorized to use force in very specific circumstances; these are
dictated by agency policies and are sanctioned by state statutes and federal laws. Police also
receive extensive training in use-of-force methods. Individual state policing standards guidelines
mandate this training annually (GAO, 2005). Officers routinely encounter situations when use of
force is appropriate (NIJ, 1998, p.38). Research by Adams et al. (1999) found that officers used
or threatened force in only a small percentage of police-citizen encounters based on survey
responses from citizens. Most of these encounters involve a limited use of force, such as
detaining, handcuffing, and searching suspects, prior to making arrests (Adams et. al., 1999;
Garner & Maxwell, 1999; McLaughlin, 1992; Stetser, 2001; Terrill, 2001). Limited force may
also be used with suspects who are noncompliant or combative (Croft, 1986); typical examples
include restraining unruly combatants, confronting armed suspects, or controlling disruptive
demonstrators (Garner, Buchanan, Schrade & Hepbern, 1996; McLaughlin, 1992). When
suspects are only resisting the actions or commands of officers but not physically resisting in use
of force encounters they are only offering passive level resistance. When that resistance escalates
2

to physical movements to either resist the actions of the officer or escape, this escalation is
considered active physical resistance. This distinction is one of the key elements of this study
and this terminology has been used by many police agencies to describe levels of resistance
when developing use-of-force guidelines and policies.
Research by Adams et al. (1999) has shown that most police use of force involves the use
of weaponless tactics, such as grabbing or holding, to control suspects. Police typically use force
when they are trying to make an arrest and the suspect resists. Police use weapons in about two
percent of all arrests (Adams et al., 1999). The weapon most frequently used was chemical spray
(1.2 percent of all arrests). Firearms were the least often used (0.2 percent) (Adams et al., 1999).
According to Adams et al. (1999), “The kinds of police actions that most arouse the
public’s concerns—such as fatal shootings, severe beatings with fists or batons that lead to
hospitalization, and choke holds that cause unconsciousness or even death—are not the typical
situations in which police use force” (p.5). Most injuries that occur as a result of the use of force
are more likely to be minor such as bruises or abrasions (Adams et al., 1999; Alpert & Dunham,
1997; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987).
Most police officers are trained to use force incrementally along a Use-of-Force
Continuum (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Conner, 1991; Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan,
1995; McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill, 2003). Supreme Court decisions and police policies dictate that
officers use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish their mission (Graham vs.
Connor (109 S.Ct.1986 [1989]). Part of this progression in force involves the incremental
application of a variety of use-of-force tools and tactics designed to counter or defeat the
resistance of a suspect. The number and sophistication of these tools has increased significantly
over the last few decades. Historically, officers only had their hands or nightsticks to use before
3

escalating to firearms. Modern force continuums contain several other measures or tools to
employ prior to using deadly force. Many of these alternatives are new technologies developed
to provide options for officers to use in specific situations. The Use-of-Force Continuum
provides a guide for the incremental and proportional use of these options when encountering
resistance (Bittner, 1970; Conner, 1991; Terrill, 2001, 2003). Table 1 provides an example of a
Use-of-Force Continuum. A short history of these alternatives is then provided.

Table 1: Use-of-Force Continuum
Suspect resistance
1. No resistance
2. Verbal noncompliance
3. Passive resistance
4. Active resistance
5. Aggressive resistance
6. Deadly force resistance

Use-of-Force Continuum
Officer use of force
1. Officer Presence
2. Verbal commands
3. Hands-on tactics, Chemical spray
4. Intermediate weapons: Baton, Taser,
Strikes, Non-deadly force
5. Intermediate weapons-Intensified techniques,
Non-deadly force
6. Deadly force

Adapted from the Orlando Police Department’s Resistance and Response Continuum and (Terrill, 2003)

The Application of Technology to Police Use of Force
Police leaders have most often looked to technology to address public concerns resulting
from police/citizen confrontations that require use of force. The technologies typically sought are
less-than-lethal alternatives to the more traditional means of controlling suspects, such as impact
weapons or weaponless tactics (Villa & Morris, 1999). These alternatives were once only
available to special weapons teams who dealt with barricaded suspects, making high-risk
apprehensions, or controlling large-scale civil disturbances (Bailey, 1996). In the last few
4

decades, however, police have systematically mainstreamed these weapons into the conventional
police workforce. Prior to the introduction of these less-than-lethal alternatives, officers had very
limited ways of escalating from empty-handed tactics to deadly force.
Impact weapons, such as the nightstick or billy club, have been used for centuries by
police (Villa & Morris, 1999). Variants of the baton or nightstick became popular with law
enforcement in the 1980s and early 1990s. These include side-handled and expandable batons
(Truncale, 1996). The public outcry after the Rodney King beating by Los Angeles police in
1991 focused on the baton as a brutal, barbaric, and antiquated police weapon (Meyer, 1992).
While police continue to carry and use impact weapons, the focus of police research and
manufacturers of use-of-force technology has shifted to developing less-than-lethal weapons that
reduce the frequency of permanent injuries and allow officers to incapacitate suspects while still
maintaining a safe distance (Bleetman, 2004). These modern and sophisticated offerings, such as
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) sprays; conducted energy devices, such as tasers or stun guns; and
bean bag projectiles, achieve this goal with varying degrees of success and reduced amounts of
unintended or unnecessary injuries (Lumb & Friday, 1997; McBride & Tedder, 2005).

The Use of Chemical Spray by Police
The use of chemical sprays by police officers began in the 1980s. These weapons
immediately gained popularity as alternatives to impact weapons or empty-handed tactics to gain
compliance. Chemical sprays inflict less traumatic injuries than impact weapons, and they are
seen as a less violent way of addressing noncompliant or violent offenders (Kaminski, Edwards,
& Johnson, 1998, 1999; Morabito & Doerner, 1997).
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While generally seen as effective by the police, certain types of chemical sprays have
been criticized for being linked to deaths of suspects, and they are also susceptible to
inappropriate use by officers (Lumb & Friday, 1997). Research into the effectiveness of
chemical sprays has validated, to some extent, their use. Several studies of OC spray use by
police agencies have documented higher rates of incapacitation and a reduction of injuries to
suspects (Alpert & Smith, 2000; Kaminski et al., 1998; 1999; Morabito & Doerner, 1997).
A two-year study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found that of the 899
subjects exposed to OC spray none of the subjects suffered ill effects or adverse reactions
(Weaver, 1989). In the early 1990s, there were claims that pepper spray was implicated as a
contributing factor in some in-custody deaths. OC spray can compromise breathing in some
people who may suffer from asthma or other breathing ailments (Kaminski, et al, 1998). In
response to those claims, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted a study of the pepper spray use by police and related
in-custody deaths. The study’s findings were that pepper spray alone was not the cause of the
deaths. The study identified that positional asphyxia, the positioning of the suspect’s body
during transport or detention, subsequent to the use of spray may have been a contributing factor
in these cases (NIJ, 1998).
The principal criticism of chemical spray, from police officer’s perspective, is from the
overspray that occurs when the chemical is deployed (NIJ, 1998). Officers are exposed
frequently to the chemicals from the spray while securing or transporting suspects or from
inhaling the fumes that are suspended in the air after a deployment. This can potentially
incapacitate them and put them at risk for being disarmed or overpowered. In addition, innocent
bystanders or assisting officers also can be the unintended recipient of overspray (Adkins, 2003).
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The accuracy of chemical sprays is much less than that of conventional firearms (Adang &
Mensink, 2004; Bowling & Gaines, 2000).

The Use of Conducted Energy Devices by Police
Conducted energy devices encompass a wide range of weapons that rely on electrical
shock to incapacitate combative and/or noncompliant suspects. These include stun guns, stun
belts, electronic control weapons, and tasers (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). These weapons are
the latest developments in a succession of less-than-lethal products developed and employed by
both police and the military (McEwen, 1997; Meyer, 1992).
There are primarily two types of electronic control weapons. The first type of these
weapons uses two metal probes that are pressed directly into the skin or clothing of a suspect.
These are designated direct contact weapons. When the probes on the front of the weapon make
contact this completes a circuit that delivers an electrical shock to the suspect. This electrical
charge debilitates the suspect by convulsing muscles and momentarily disrupting the central
nervous system (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006). The second type of device fires two darts with
hooks connected to the weapon by thin wires which conduct the electric charge (Nielsen, 2001).
When the darts penetrate the suspect’s skin or clothing, a circuit is completed and an electrical
charge is delivered (Williams, 2001).
The primary benefit of these weapons is that they typically incapacitate a suspect very
quickly. Direct contact stun weapons incapacitate suspects by causing pain and loss of muscle
control. This control is only maintained while the weapon is in direct contact with the suspect.
These weapons require the operator to remain in close contact with the suspect during the
encounter. This can be potentially dangerous for the operator when the weapon is disengaged
7

and the suspect must then be secured (Kornblum, 1991). This is the same problem that was
discussed with the use of OC spray. Officers who are in close proximity to suspects during an
encounter can be exposed unintentionally to overspray (Adkins, 2003).
The incapacitating effect of the dart-firing electrical shocking device can be
instantaneous, and it lasts for several seconds. This is usually sufficient time to allow the suspect
to be properly restrained. The dart-firing device also can be reactivated repeatedly if more time is
required for restraint or backup. “Once the flow of electrical current stops, the suspect recovers
rapidly, generally from several seconds to a few minutes” (Nielson, 2001, p.61).
One of the main benefits of direct contact conducted energy devices is that they can be
used in a confined space. The maximum range for these weapons is the length of the arm of the
person employing it. The dart firing weapons have a maximum range of 15 to 21 feet. The barbs
can be discharged at very close range, but are most effective at a minimum distance of 3 feet
from the operator. These weapons rely on the same “point, aim, and shoot” technique used in
traditional firearms training. They are small, portable and can be fired with only one hand
(Nielson, 2001, p.59).

The Introduction of Tasers as a Less-than-Lethal Alternative for Police
TASER is an acronym for Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle, named after Tom Swift, of the
popular American Children’s adventure series of the 1920s and 1930s (IACP, 2004). Taser
technology has been used by law enforcement agencies since 1974 (GAO, 2005; Nielson, 2001).
The device was invented by Jack Cover, a NASA scientist who had experimented with electricity
as a non-deadly weapon during the 1960s. The original versions of the taser used gunpowder to
fire the electronic probes and, therefore, were classified as firearms under the 1968 Gun Control
8

Act (IACP, 2004). Cover discovered that immediate incapacitation almost always occurred with
no other direct negative side effects when tasers were applied to human beings in short duration
(Griffith, 2002; Nielson, 2001).
Modern tasers have been modified significantly to address design flaws and to improve
reliability and effectiveness (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; GAO, 2005). The latest models feature
a nitrogen gas propulsion system that fires two darts from a maximum distance of 21 feet, at 200220 feet per second. The probes impact and penetrate ¼ inch into clothing or bare skin,
delivering 10-20 pulses per second of 50,000 volts of electrical shock. The recipient feels a series
of “rabbit punches” or “boxer’s jabs” (Vogel, 1998, p. 49). Each of these shocks ensures the
target suspect is “off balance, confused, and unable to aggress while the recipient of the action”
(p. 49). The electric charge, which causes an interruption of the recipient’s neuromuscular
messages and muscle contractions, seeks a path of least resistance to reach the companion dart
(Vogel, 1998).

The Controversy Surrounding Taser Use by Police
The use of tasers by police is not without criticism. Since their inception as a less-thanlethal alternative for police, tasers have evoked strong reactions from those who oppose their use
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; McBride & Tedder, 2005). Many critics of tasers compare their
use to the use of electronic cattle prods as implements of torture. Both tasers and batons were
used by Los Angeles police officers during the Rodney King beating incident (Meyer, 1992).
This incident and the violence that ensued from this use-of-force encounter became a focal point
for criticism of the police over excessive force issues. One of the primary issues with taser use is
when officers should be authorized to use them. The Use-of-Force Continuum is the mechanism
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that guides police use of force and establishes what level of resistance must be present before
various use-of-force methods can be used (Conner, 1991). The interpretation of what is excessive
in a given situation often is based on the placement of use-of-force methods on the Use-of-Force
Continuum.
During the last two decades, various articles from periodicals and newspapers have
detailed the criticisms of the use of tasers by public safety agencies. A 1997 report by Amnesty
International titled “Recent Cases of the Use of Electroshock Weapons for Torture or IllTreatment” lists the United States in the same class as Algeria and China with respect to human
rights violations (Amnesty International, 1997). The report alleges that the taser is misused by
police during use-of-force incidents. “Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties
Union both claim that these devices are unsafe and may actually encourage sadistic acts by
police officers and prison guards” (Cusac, 1997, p.29). In 2004, Amnesty International called for
a moratorium on the use of these weapons until an independent inquiry on the use and effects of
the taser was conducted (Amnesty International, 2004). Even police agencies' opinions on the
use of tasers by their officers conflict.
A Milwaukee Police report noted that 70 percent of persons hit with tasers during a 12week period suffered some type of injury although none were serious (Diedrich, 2004). Statistics
from the Los Angeles Police Department, compiled during a three-year period, show that tasers
were effective at controlling suspects only 56% of the time (Hamilton, 2002). In Orange County,
Florida, the sheriff office's use of tasers resulted in a decrease of OC spray and baton use by
officers; however, the total number of use-of-force incidents increased by 58 percent over three
years (Berenson, 2004). Citing concerns about the safety of tasers, the Department of Homeland
Security has voiced its objection to deploying these devices to 20,000 agents in their two largest
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law enforcement divisions, Customs Enforcement and Customs Border Protection (Wilkening,
2005).

The Medical Controversy Surrounding the Use of Tasers
The medical community also is conflicted about the potential harmful effects of taser use.
A February 2002 Time Magazine article cited a medical review conducted at the Cleveland
Clinic. Dr. Patrick Tchou, a cardiologist, reviewed the few existing scientific studies on stun
guns and concluded that there is “…some potential for harm, such as irregular heart beat, that
could lead to death” (Hamilton, 2002, p. 50). According to Amnesty International, more than 150
people have died after being shocked by tasers (Berenson, 2006). This claim is adamantly denied
by Taser International, a leading manufacturer of taser products (TASER International, 2004).
According to a July 19, 2004, Taser International press release, “The fact is that TASER devices
have never been named as the primary cause of death in any in-custody death, and any links as a
contributing factor are subjective and unsupported by clear evidence” (p.2).
Amnesty International's claim is also refuted by the United Kingdom’s Defense Scientific
Advisory Council’s subcommittee on the medical implications of less-than-lethal weapons. That
study concluded that the risk of life threatening or serious injuries from the M26 Advanced Taser
appears to be very low (DOMILL, 2004). Research supports that many of the deaths associated
with the use of tasers involved subjects exhibiting signs of stimulant or alcohol use when
engaged in confrontations with the police. This phenomenon has been labeled “excited
delirium,” a condition brought on by physical exertion or stress during a physical struggle in
combination with these substances in the body (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; Fish & Geddes,
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2001; Kornblum, 1991; Marks, 2005; OCSO task force, 2005). This finding is not unexpected as
many suspects are under the influence of substances when encountered by police.
The use of tasers in combination with chemical sprays also has generated public concern.
Early forms of pepper spray contained mixtures that contained flammable materials, such as
isopropyl alcohol, dymel, and methylene chloride (NIJ, 1998, p.43). These mixtures created
controversy during a 1991 incident involving New York City Police officers who used the taser
on a barricaded subject after chemical spray failed to subdue him. The subject caught fire when
hit by the taser’s electric current, which ignited the flammable mixture from the spray (Jett,
1997).

Proponents of Taser Use
The popularity of the taser with law enforcement agencies is clearly on the rise.
According to Taser International, the weapons are used by almost 10,000 police departments in
the United States and abroad (Berenson, 2006). According the Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF) the use of stun technology by law enforcement agencies has increased significantly since
1999 (PERF, 2005). This increase can be attributed to an influx of a newer generation of taser
weapons that are being aggressively marketed to police agencies (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006).
Sales figures for TASER International Inc., the principal supplier of tasers to law enforcement
agencies, indicate the company’s revenue has increased from around “$2.2 million in 1999, to an
estimated $67 million for fiscal year 2004” (McBride & Tedder, 2005, p.8). Across the United
States, police agencies are purchasing and equipping their officers with the newest taser
products. Presently, about 130,000 officers in 7,000 police departments are armed with tasers
and, in some cities, such as Miami and Phoenix, every police officer is equipped with a taser
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(Wilkening, 2005). According to the United States General Accounting Office (2005), tasers
have been deployed in 70,000 actual field uses during police encounters.
Taser proponents concede that the effects of these weapons can be unpleasant but argue
that the number of deaths that might be attributed to the stun gun pales in comparison to the
30,000 or so Americans who are killed each year by gunshot wounds (Cronin & Ederheimer,
2006). Taser International CEO Rick Smith states “what our weapon does is unpleasant but it can
save lives” (Hamilton, 2002, p. 50).
The primary reason for the renewed popularity of the taser is related directly to the
improvements in the design and reliability of newer models (Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006).
Statistics related to the ability of tasers to control resistive suspects range from “33% ineffective
(Commissioner Howard Safir, NYPD) to 85% effective (per manufacturer Tasertron)” (Nielsen,
2001, p. 57). Early taser models were less powerful, operating in the 5 to 14 watt range, as
opposed to more modern tasers, which generate 18 to 26 watts of power. This increased power is
able to defeat or overcome even the most determined adversary (Nielsen, 2001).
The latest models are smaller and more portable, making them easier to be carried by
uniformed officers. These models also contain an internal memory that can be accessed by
computer to determine the time, date, and number of taser deployments during a use-of-force
encounter. This memory provides police agencies a measure of control and accountability when
investigating allegations of misconduct with tasers by their officers (Nielsen, 2001).
The use of tasers in Central Florida, which includes the study site the Orlando Police
Department (OPD), has been the subject of considerable media coverage. The use of tasers by
OPD officers as well as other area police agencies has been widely reported on by the mass
media. This media coverage has fueled the public controversy over the use of tasers in low level
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or passive resistance confrontations. This controversy has motivated agencies to change their
policies on the use of tasers in these low intensity or passive resistance encounters to restrict and
mitigate taser use. These policy changes and their effect on taser usage and officer attitudes
about taser use after these changes are the focus of this study.

The Benefits of Proposed Research
The purpose of this study is to examine an organizational policy change on the use of
tasers as a less-lethal alternative for police. Since the introduction of the Use-of-Force
Continuum in the late 1980’s, police have used variants to guide officers’ use of force (Conner,
1991). The Use-of-Force Continuum acts as a guide for the officer to incrementally and
proportionally increase or decrease the type and amount of force used against noncompliant or
combative suspects based on the level of resistance encountered (Conner, 1991; Garner et al.
1996; Stetser 2001; Terrill, 2001, 2003).
The controversy over where the taser should be placed on the Use-of-Force Continuum is
the impetus for the policy change. The change raised the level of resistance needed to authorize
taser use. Whether suspects must be actively resisting or only passively resisting the actions of
officers before tasers should be used is the critical issue among many in law enforcement circles.
This study examines this issue by analyzing archival use-of-force data before and after a police
department changed their policy and raised the level of force necessary to use tasers on suspects
showing passive to active resistance.
The study site for this research was the Orlando Police Department (OPD) in Orlando,
Florida. This agency is a mid to large sized municipal police agency located in the southeast
United States. The agency employs over 700 sworn officers. OPD serves a rapidly growing and
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diverse population of over 217,000 residents (FDLE, 2005). In 2001, the agency adopted the
taser as a less than lethal use-of-force method. The use of the taser was initially authorized in
situations where suspects were offering passive resistance to officers during arrests and
encounters. Almost immediately, local media reports highlighted the use of tasers on suspects
who were only passively resisting officers and the deployment of tasers on children in school
disturbances. Five suspects who were shot with tasers by Orange County police agencies (1 by
OPD officers and 4 by Orange County Sheriff’s Office (OCSO) deputies) subsequently died
while in police custody (Colarossi, Leusner & Moore, 2006). This controversy led to the
formation of citizen committees that reviewed taser use by both the OPD and the OCSO and
made recommendations (OCSO Task Force, 2005). In June 2004, Orange County Sheriff Kevin
Beary conducted a televised demonstration of taser use. He allowed himself to be shot with a
taser as a demonstration of the safety of the taser as a less-than-lethal weapon. Also in June
2004, the Chief of Police in Orlando changed his agency’s use of force policy, raising the
authorized level for deployment of the taser from passive to active resistance. It is this change
and the effect on taser deployments that are the subject of this study. These events demonstrate
the climate of public and media interest in taser usage in the Central Florida area during the
Summer of 2004. The influence that this attention had on taser use by officers and policy
decisions by police leaders cannot be understated or accurately measured.
If taser deployments fell after the change in organizational policy, it provides evidence
that not only are officers using this weapon in accordance with policy but also that the placement
of electronic control weapons use may actually be placed correctly in the Use-of-Force
Continuum associated with active resistance. However, if there was no change in the use of
tasers (controlling for situational exigencies), it may indicate that, despite the change in policy,
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the police culture in this jurisdiction (and possibly others) may be stronger than policy directives
handed down by the administrative cadre. To conduct this analysis, the research examines
archival records in the period before and after the change in policy and officers were asked
directly how this policy has changed their use patterns. It is hoped that this combination of
methods will allow this research to blaze a new path in research that will match police practice,
culture, and administrative policy directives.
To better understand police use of tasers and to examine what constitutes its effectiveness
as a less-than-lethal weapon, it is necessary to review the literature related to not just police
weapons, but also to the role of police and the issue of police use of force. This examination will
provide a short summary of the evolving police mission and the role of technology in how police
deal with the issue of use of force.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
The evolution of policing in America has exposed a myriad of problems and challenges
for police leaders and criminal justice practitioners (Vila & Morris, 1999). The vast majority of
these problems and challenges have been created by the constantly evolving nature of the police
mission, the increasing demands placed on police, and the sometimes unrealistic expectations of
the public (Wadman & Allison, 2004). An examination of the historical progression of policing
reveals a litany of problems and public scrutiny involving policing tactics (Kelling & Wycoff,
2001). Many of these problems were exacerbated by the lack of professionalism of police leaders
and their cultural and institutional resistance to change (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969; Vila &
Morris, 1999). One of the fundamental issues confronting police administrators is directing,
controlling, and monitoring the use of force by their officers (Bittner, 1970; Fyfe, 1988). This
issue has occupied the public’s interest and has contributed to a climate of distrust and animosity
between the police and the public they serve (Belotto, 2001). Many of these incidents involve the
use of deadly force to apprehend or control offenders (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989). As
advancements in technology created more less-than-lethal (LTL) options for officers in use-offorce confrontations, police administrators quickly grasped at them as a potential solution for
these issues (Bleetman, 2004). These options afforded officers a wider variety of methods to
control suspects without having to resort to more controversial, violent, or deadly forms of force
(NIJ, 1998). Often, these LTL options lacked the practical research or rigorous evaluation to
support their deployment. In some incidences, this led to unintended harm to suspects or abuses
by officers that have been highlighted by the mass media (Belotto, 2001; Amnesty International,
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1999, 2004). This negative publicity has led to calls from the public for reform and reevaluation
of these methods.
The latest offering in LTL alternatives for police is the taser. Although the police have
been using the taser since the 1970s, the newest models are more powerful and effective at
rendering uncontrollable suspects compliant while minimizing officer and suspect injuries (NIJ,
1998; GAO, 2005). Since the mid 1990s, police agencies have been issuing tasers to officers at a
record pace (GAO, 2005).
What is less prevalent in the empirical research is if public perception and civil litigation
led to the policy changes that attempt to alter when officers are authorized to use electronic
control devices. Additionally, more research is needed to determine if introducing these policy
changes have had any substantial effect on the frequency of taser use, officer and suspect
injuries, or the levels of resistance offered by noncompliant suspects.

Police Use of Force
To fulfill their crime fighting and order maintenance roles, police must use force to
restore order, take charge, or capture and control noncompliant suspects (Bittner, 1970, 1990).
Incidents of force have frequently sparked criticism and controversy (Kelling & Wycoff, 2001).
In an effort to improve their public image and mitigate their exposure to civil liability, police
agencies have frequently sought out technology as a solution (NIJ, 1998).
In the late 1980s, Supreme Court rulings spurred changes in police procedure, prohibiting
the use of deadly force simply to stop fleeing suspects. In a 1985 decision, Tennessee vs. Garner
(471 1 US [1985]), the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, when a law
enforcement officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, deadly force may only be used to prevent
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escape and only when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others (Tennessee v. Garner,
1985). In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in Graham vs. Connor (109 S.Ct.1986 [1989]) that an
officer’s decision regarding the level of force to use must be judged from the perspective of the
reasonable person and be based on the circumstances, which are often rapidly evolving and
unclear.
These landmark rulings set the standards for the Use-of-Force Continuum and for how
and when police should apply force. The court recognized that officers must be able to escalate,
or deescalate, levels of force to match the level of resistance presented by suspects in
police/citizen encounters based on the standard of “objective reasonableness.” While these
rulings were instructive for police, they also forced police to explore new ways to capture or
control suspects in these types of situations (Pliant, 1993). The standard of objective
reasonableness is a generalized standard and is not universally understood or interpreted. This
ambiguity has forced police agencies to adopt LTL policies to guide officers in use of force
encounters that more clearly define and articulate what is reasonable force in a given set of
circumstances.
To meet these legally imposed mandates, police agencies have relied strongly on
technology to expand their options when dealing with uncooperative or noncompliant suspects.
This point is made clear by the inclusion of many of these new control devices in a given
agency’s Use-of-Force Continuum. The goal of the continuum, and the placement of these tactics
within it, is to reduce the amount of force used by officers and to lower the risk of unintentional
or serious injuries to suspects or officers. Despite the recent focus on technology to control the
amount of force used in specific situations, technology has a long history of shaping the practices
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of the police. Despite an evolution in the responsibilities placed on the police, the essential role
of protecting the public has not changed that much since they were first founded in this country.
The police are charged with the maintenance of order and enforcing laws. They are also seen as
one of the most visible and powerful arms of government (Bittner, 1990). The use of force to
advance the aims of government has always been controversial and subjective. A brief discussion
of this topic is presented to provide substantive background to this issue and to clarify its
relevance to this study.

The Role of Police in Modern Society
Throughout their history, police have been forced to continually reassess their role,
develop new ways to fulfill their mission, and adapt in an ever-changing social and political
environment. Today, police are faced with a continually expanding role in domestic security in a
post 9/11 world (Wadman & Allison, 2004).
Historically, the solutions most often sought by police to meet the changing demands of
the public have been grounded in new technologies to advance the delivery of police services.
Despite the many technological advancements made for and by police, use of force remains a
topic of debate and controversy. Often, the public’s perception of the ability of police to maintain
order and control crime is framed by these limited and random occurrences (Adams, et al.,
1999).
In a study of the functions of police, noted criminal justice scholar Egon Bittner proposed
that “the police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified
force in society “(1970, p. 39). Bittner states that most police work involves stopping
“something- that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-somebody-had-better-do20

something- now” (Bittner, 1970; p. 39). This statement identifies the core of the debate on how
much force police should use to bring order to chaos. Bittner (1970) recognized that excessive,
unnecessary, or minimal use of force by police is very difficult to define or quantify.
In an attempt to provide some standards or guidance on when officers should use force,
Bittner (1990) posited that because criminal law is vague, police administrators have developed
taxonomies of force to guide their officer’s conduct. Often, these taxonomies are manifested by
“use-of-force continua,” which provide a guide for officers on the types and amount of force that
can be used in a given situation (Klinger, 1995).
In addressing the debate over why injuries to suspects are a natural byproduct of the
police function, Bittner (1990) characterizes police as “the fire it takes to fight fire and that they
in the natural course of their duties inflict harm, albeit deserved” (p.96). Unfortunately, the
nature of police work is that harm is sometimes inflicted, despite the best efforts of police to
control events and behavior. Police are most often called upon to interdict or stop some act of
violence, unwanted behavior, or threat to public safety. This preemptive action is almost always
spontaneous and not necessarily conceived by the officer. The outcome of this action is often
reviewed extensively by others, both internally by police managers and by the public, typically
filtered by media reports. These reviews have often raised questions and concerns about when
and how much force was used to quell a disturbance or take a suspect into custody. The
difference in perceptions of the public and police as to what exactly constitutes justified force
contributes significantly to this debate. According to Bittner (1990):
Though it is expected that policemen will be judicious and that experience and skill will
guide them in the performance of their work, it is foolish to expect that they could always
be swift and subtle. Nor is it reasonable to demand that they prevail, where they are
supposed to prevail while hoping that they will always handle resistance gently (p. 97).
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For some members of the public, politicians and some police administrators, the simple
solution is to use less force. Fyfe (1987) discusses the negative consequences of both
unnecessary force by officers and the consequences of insufficient use of force by police. The
use of unnecessary force by police can lead to significant negative consequences, to include
unnecessary injuries to the suspect or death, community complaints, distrust of the police, civil
liability, civil unrest, and federal injunctive orders. Insufficient use of force exposes officers to
harm or death, negatively affects an officer’s ability to enforce the law, and increases the danger
to public safety. Fyfe (1987) concludes that unnecessary force “could be avoided by measures
such as better training, officer selection, and other use-of-force options” (p.6).
Much of the research and policy emphasis by police has focused on reduction of harm to
officers and suspects in use-of-force confrontations. This objective forms the basis of the
development of use-of-force alternatives. Use of force by police is an integral part of police
work. It remains a point of controversy and debate for police practitioners and criminal justice
scholars. A brief summary of this research is provided.

The Research on Police Use of Force
Police are one of the few institutions of government authorized to use force (Bittner,
1970; Fyfe, 1988). The use of force by police to compel conformance to law is at the very core
of their mission and purpose (Bittner, 1970). Through the use of various methods, such as field
observations (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1988; Terrill, 2001), conducting
surveys of officers (Garner et al., 1995; Lundstrom & Millan, 1987), and examining agency useof-force data (Alpert & Dunham, 1997, 1999; Kavanagh, 1994; Meyer, 1992; Morabito &
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Doerner, 1997), researchers have attempted to determine the extent to which police use and
misuse force (Ederheimer & Fridell, 2005).
Various studies have also attempted to identify situational, individual and community
level factors to explain why officers use force (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980;
Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Worden, 1995; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill, 2003). There is
also a considerable body of research examining the area of deadly force; specifically, police use
of deadly force by firearms (Binder & Fridell, 1984; Fyfe, 1979; 1980; 1988; Geller & Scott,
1992).
Generally, research on non-deadly police use of force is grouped into two distinct areas.
These include studies on authorized police use of force (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich,
1980; Fyfe, 1988) and studies on unauthorized use of force by police (Bayley & Mendelsohn,
1969; Fyfe, 1980; Geller & Toch, 1995). Research on non-lethal force suffers from the same
shortcomings as the research on lethal force; namely, an inability to define adequately what
constitutes reasonable or excessive force (Bittner, 1970: 1990;Garner et al., 1995) (See Table 2).
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Table 2: Studies of Police Use of Force
Author(s)
Fredrich (1980)
Croft (1985)
Fyfe (1989)
Lundstrom &
Mullan (1987)
Bayley & Garafalo
(1989)
Meyer (1992)
McLaughlin
(1992)
Pate & Fridell
(1993)
Kavanagh (1997)
Garner et al.
(1995)
Worden (1995)
Alpert & Dunham
(1997)
Lumb & Friday
(1997)
Morabito &
Doerner (1997)
Kaminski et al.
(1999)
Terrill (2001)

Terrill &
Mastrofski (2002)

Nature of sample
1,565 police citizen encounters in
DC, Boston, and Chicago.
(Reexamination of Reiss, 1969)
2,397 uses of force from 123,500
arrests made by Rochester, NY police
2,142 violent encounters in Dade
County FL.
11,989 custody situations in St. Paul,
Minn.
467 police citizen encounters in NYC

Data Date
1966

Data type
Observational
data

1973-1979

568 use-of-force incidents involving
LAPD officers
11,000 arrests by Savannah GA.
Police
1,111 law enforcement agencies were
surveyed on the use of all types of
weapons and citizens' complaints
1,108 arrests made at the NY port
authority bus terminal
1585 arrests in Phoenix, AZ.

1989

Use of force
forms
Observational
data
Officers' useof-force forms
Observational
data
Use of force
forms
Use of force
forms
Agency
surveys

5,688 police citizen encounters in St.
Louis, Missouri; Rochester, NY; and
Tampa, FL
676 Use of force incidents in MiamiDade County, FL
61 Use of force incidents in
Concord, NC
999 Use-of- force encounters in
Tallahassee, FL
878 OC Spray incidents in Baltimore
County, MD
3,544 police encounters with suspects
in St. Petersburg, FL and
Indianapolis, IN
3,544 police encounters with suspects
in St. Petersburg, FL and
Indianapolis, IN
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1985 to 1986
March 1985 February 1986
Summer 1986

1989
1991
1990-1991

Arrest Reports

1994

Use of force
forms
Observational
data

1977
1997-1998
July1992December 1993
1993-1995
1993-1996
St. Petersburg,FL
(Summer 1997)
and Indianapolis,
IN (Summer
1996)
St. Petersburg,FL
(Summer) 1997
and Indianapolis,
IN (Summer
1996)

Use of force
forms
Use of force
forms
Use of force
forms
Survey data
Observational
data

Observational
data

Studies Examining the Factors That Influence Use of Force
Friedrich (1980), using Reiss’ (1969) observational data, examined what factors most
significantly influence police use of force. He determined that the traditional factors that had
been previously regarded as having an effect on police use of force (such as situational and
organizational factors) were, in fact, not significant. Friedrich determined that situational
characteristics of encounters, such as race, gender, social class, and suspect demeanor, were
more predictive of police use of force.
Garner, Buchanan, Schrade, and Hepbern (1995) examined 1,585 officer surveys of use
of force and conducted 185 interviews of suspects involved in use-of-force incidents. The
surveys captured specific situational characteristics relevant to the officers’ use of force. The
suspects in these incidents were interviewed to provide insight into the dynamics of how the
force was used. The study’s findings supported the notion that police use force very infrequently
when compared to the number of arrests made. The study found that 1 in 5 arrests required police
to use some physical force. Suspects offered resistance in 1 of every 6 arrests. Police use
weapons in 2 percent of all arrests. A blunt force impact weapon was the weapon most
frequently used (12 times in 1,585 arrests). The study found that the single best predictor of
police use of force was suspect use of force (Garner et al., 1996).
Kavanagh (1997) studied arrest records from resisting arrest incidents during 1990 and
1991 at the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal. This study identified that the arrestee’s
behavior prior to resisting the officer’s attempts to arrest was most closely associated with the
officer’s need to use force. These behaviors included disrespect of the officer, alcohol
intoxication, and the seriousness of the original crime charged. The significance of this research

25

is that it supports the finding that officers play a much smaller role in the occurrence of resisting
arrest than previously thought.
Terrill (2001), using observational data from 3,544 police citizen encounters during the
summers of 1996 and 1997 in St. Petersburg, Florida and Indianapolis, Indiana, developed the
idea of using force factor scores. These scores assess not only the highest level of suspect
resistance and use of force within an incident but also include all instances of resistance and
force that take place. This study found that encounters that began with some form of force
resulted in a greater frequency of subsequent suspect resistance and an increased use of
additional force at some later point in the encounters. This study underscores the importance of
understanding police use of force relative to suspect resistance (Terrill, 2005).
Terrill and Mastrofski (2002), analyzing the same observational data from police citizen
encounters in St, Petersburg and Indianapolis, concluded that police used more force against
non-white, younger, poorer, or intoxicated suspects who resisted police authority. Police use of
force was statistically unrelated to angry, disrespectful, or mentally impaired suspects.

The Prevalence of Force in Police-Citizen Encounters
The public’s confidence level of police agencies can be greatly altered by a single
incident of police use-of-force abuse. For this reason, police have sought to regulate use of force
by officers by providing policies and guidelines that outline a steady progression of the levels of
force that must be applied to gain compliance. Frequently, these levels are based on various
weapons and methods authorized to respond to a corresponding level of resistance by suspects.
Examinations of police use-of-force reports, excessive use-of-force complaints, and citizen or
officer surveys all affirm the low incidence of police use of force in encounters with citizens
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(Adams, et al., 1999; Garner & Maxwell, 1999). However, each of these research methodologies
has their specific strengths and weaknesses (Pate & Fridell, 1993). Observational studies have
sometimes been criticized for not generating sufficient data (Garner et. al, 1995). However, more
recent work by Terrill buffers this criticism (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill, 2003). Data on
excessive force complaints can only provide indirect measures of actual behavior. Surveys and
interviews tend to measure perceptions of force or excessive force, which may differ from actual
events (Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002). Scenario-based surveys typically do not capture
accurate responses of what officers would really do in specific situations (Alpert & Smith, 1999).
Agency-generated use-of-force data is often biased towards a best-case depiction of events, or it
presents an agency-biased perspective (Garner et. al, 1995).
The question of how infrequently police use force has generated considerable debate
among professionals. In an observational study of the frequency of the use of non-lethal force by
New York police officers, Bayley and Garafalo (1989) found that officers used physical force
with citizens in only 8 percent of the 467 documented encounters. This study supports other
research findings in that the use of force is rare in police-citizen encounters, although their study
did not distinguish between what is reasonable and unreasonable force.
Croft (1985) examined forms relating to the use of force that were completed by
Rochester, New York, officers during a six-year period. This research indicated that physical
force was only used against citizens in 2,397 of the 123,500 arrests made during the examination
period. This reinforced the notion that police use force rarely in encounters with the public.
Surprisingly, she found that the vast majority (80%) of the use-of-force incidents examined
involved misdemeanors, violations, or no criminal situations.
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Fyfe (1989) used observational data from a study of 2,412 potentially violent situations in
Dade County, Florida. This study found that officers used force greater than a firm voice
command in only 12 percent of use-of-force incidents. The greatest limitation of this study rests
in its reliance on trained observers to make judgments about the levels of force used, making
synthesis of the data difficult.
McLaughlin (1992), relying on official use-of-force reports of arrests in Savannah,
Georgia completed during 1989, discovered only 133 use-of-force incidents in over 11,000
arrests. Of the 133 incidents, 45 involved instances in which officers punched or kicked citizens,
11 in which officers struck citizens with a baton, and 2 in which officers sprayed citizens with
mace. The results of this study concluded that police used force in as low as 1 percent of the
cases examined.
Adams et al. (1999) using data from the 1996 pilot test of the PPCS (Police-Public
Contact Survey) found that only about 1 percent of people reporting contacts with police said
that officers used or threatened force. This research found that police used physical force in less
than 20 percent of 7,512 arrests studied. Weaponless tactics such as grabbing or holding were
primarily used. Grabbing was the tactic used about one-half of the time. Police used weapons in
only 2 percent of all arrests. When weapons were used, chemical sprays were the weapon of
choice (1.2 percent of all arrests) with firearms least often used (0.2 percent).
Worden (1995), using observational data from a police services study in 60
neighborhoods surrounding St. Louis, Missouri; Rochester, New York; and Tampa, Florida,
reported that police used force in just over 1 percent of the nearly 5,700 police-citizen encounters
observed. Further supporting the premise of low incidence of police use of force, Langen et al,
(2001) cited findings from a 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics national survey, which reported
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that 1 percent of the people reporting face-to-face contact with the police experienced either
force or the threat of force. However, most of the force was either threatened or at a low level.
Terrill (2003) using data collected as part of an observational study of the police in
Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida, examined 3,544 police-suspect encounters in
an attempt to better understand the application of non-lethal force and the relationship between
officer use of force and suspect resistance. Terrill found that multiple uses of force and resistance
within individual encounters increases the frequency of both behaviors. Most suspects display
forceful and resistant behaviors which are typically on the lower end of continuum. When
officers use greater levels of force early on, or any time, during an encounter the level of suspect
resistance is also higher. This finding calls into question the utility of a “take charge” approach
to maintaining control within police-suspect encounters.

Injuries to Suspects in Police Use-of-Force Encounters
Further research reveals that injuries to suspects from police actions occur very rarely and
are often minor (Adams et al., 1999; Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Lundstrom & Mullan, 1987).
Most studies on police use-of-force methods have examined injuries to suspects as a central
component of their research (Alpert & Dunham 1998; Kaminski et al., 1999; Lumb & Friday,
1997; Meyer, 1991; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). Much of the research on less-than-lethal
weapons relates directly to the ability of these weapons to render uncooperative or combative
suspects compliant without inflicting unnecessary injury or deaths.
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Injuries to Officers in Use-of-Force Encounters
The reduction of officer injuries is one of the primary goals of policies governing use of
force and it also is responsible for the advent of alternatives to traditional use-of-force methods.
The effect on officer injuries from the use of LTL alternatives has been the subject of
considerable research on LTL weapons (Alpert & Dunham 1998; Kaminski et al 1999; Lumb &
Friday, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Morabito & Doerner, 1997) and police use of force in general
(Garner et al. 1996; Garner and Maxwell, 1999; Terrill et al, 2003). Most of the research related
to various use-of-force methods, such as chemical sprays (Kaminski et al, 1998), tasers
(McManus et al. 2004; Hougland et al., 2005), or multiple use-of-force methods (McLaughlin,
1992; Meyer, 1992) examine changes in the frequency of injuries to officers as a measure of
effectiveness.

The Police Use-of-Force Continuum
Research also supports that officers are trained to use force progressively along a
continuum (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; McLaughlin, 1992; Sykes & Brent, 1980; Terrill, 2001,
2003; Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2003). Supreme Court rulings, criminal statues, and
police agencies’ use-of-force policies require that officers use only that level of force reasonably
necessary to control or apprehend a suspect (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Garner et al. 1996;
Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002; Graham v Conner, 1989).
The escalation of police use of force is guided by a continuum based on a variety of
methods and tools for officers to employ when resistance to their lawful authority is encountered
(McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill, 2003; Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2003). Terrill et al. (2003)
identifies the Use-of-Force Continuum and the use-of-force reports as two of the “building
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blocks to gauge and assess use-of-force incidents” (p.151). When these two mechanisms are used
in combination, they can greatly improve the assessment of appropriate and inappropriate levels
of force. According to Terrill et al. (2003), the Use-of-Force Continuum is simply a way to
characterize and examine how officers apply force in relation to the resistance they encounter.
The primary objective of using the force continuum as a measure of police force is to determine
the extent to which officers follow or deviate from the continuum’s structure. The primary focus
of the Use-of-Force Continuum is the notion of control. If the structure of the continuum is
followed, the intended purpose of control has been achieved. If the continuum structure has not
been followed, the use of force was deemed to be for some other unauthorized purpose (Terrill,
2005).
The Use-of-Force Continuum typically initiates with verbal commands and presence by
the officer. As increasing levels of resistance to the officer’s commands and attempts to control a
suspect are encountered, the level of force is increased incrementally. If resistance is
encountered, the level of force is increased by the use of weapons such as batons, chemical
sprays, or tasers, but it can also be techniques such as empty-handed strikes or leg kicks and,
ultimately, it can culminate with officers using deadly force.
Despite the infrequency of police use of force and the limited number of injuries incurred
during that use of force, police brutality and excessive use of force remains at the forefront of
public scrutiny and media attention. Using this as a framework, any understanding of the public’s
perception of police use of force must be measured by these limited incidents.
Research on use of force has found that a variety of variables influence police use of
force. These include both situational variables, such as the presence of citizen bystanders,
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suspect characteristics and demeanor, as well as individual level variables, such as officer
characteristics. A short summary of these studies is provided.

The Research on Variables that Influence Police Use of Force
The Influence of Suspect Characteristics in Use-of-Force Encounters
A great deal of research has focused on the influence of suspect characteristics on police
use of force (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In the area of deadly
force research, the effect of race of suspects involved in police shootings has dominated the
literature (Binder & Fridell, 1984; Fyfe, 1979; 1980; 1988; Geller & Scott, 1992). Research has
found that black suspects are more likely to be stopped and interrogated by officers, but minority
suspects are also more likely to be uncooperative with police (Black, 1971; Ferdinand &
Luchterhand, 1970; Terrill et al., 2003). Suspect age and gender also has been examined as a
situational variable in police use-of-force studies (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980). Research
indicates that police typically perceive women to be less aggressive than men in use-of-force
encounters (Croft, 1985; Klinger, 1995). There has been considerable controversy about and
public scrutiny of the use of tasers on juveniles and women. Youthful offenders have been
identified in the research as being perceived by police as more threatening to them than adult
suspects (Faulkner, 1991; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Because gender and age are areas of
concern, they will be included as situational variables for analysis.
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The Number of Other Officers Present During Use-of-Force Encounters
The number of officers present at the scene of an incident has been shown to influence
officer’s propensity to use force (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). The nature of the relationship of
this variable to the use of force is mixed. Research has found that single officers tend to be more
cautious and less prone to assert themselves in situations where force may be applied (Banton,
1964; Wilson, 1963). In general, officers have been found to act differently and are unwilling to
engage in high-risk behavior when no peer support is present (Friedrich, 1977). This finding is
counter intuitive to the conventional wisdom that more officers, either in a patrol car (1 officer
patrol car versus 2 officers assigned to a patrol car), or on the scene of as use of force encounter,
provide a measure of safety for officers. The effect of the number of officers present in use-offorce encounters is an important situational variable and, as such, will be incorporated in this
study design.

The Presence of Citizen Bystanders during Police Use-of-Force Encounters
Early studies indicated that excessive force is less likely to occur in public places
(Sherman, 1980; Smith, 1986). Other research has failed to link the visibility of the situation to
changes in the frequency or severity of police use of force (Friedrich, 1980). The location where
use of force occurs has also been a subject of prior research (Friedrich, 1980; Sherman, 1980;
Smith, 1986). Additionally, studies have shown that the presence of bystanders was negatively
related to the perceived necessity of drawing a weapon (Holzworth & Pipping, 1985).
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The Types of Incidents That Lead to Use of Force
The threat or seriousness of the incident and type of incident has been found to be
significant in the use of force by police officers (Bayley & Garofolo, 1989; Garner et al, 2002;
Terrill, 2003). Other research has failed to conclusively relate the nature of the encounter to the
levels of physical force used (Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1982). Research has found that it is difficult
to link definitively the nature of the incident to the resulting use of force. Some incidents begin
as routine encounters or calls for police service that escalate to a use of force by the officer.
Other more serious offences, with suspect apprehensions, may not result in any use of force.
Research has examined the effect of whether or not an encounter was officer initiated or a
call for police service (Friedrich, 1980). Much of the criticism on the use of taser is focused on
the types of encounters that lead to its use and the role of the officer in those encounters (GAO,
2005). The change in placement of the taser in the Use-of-Force Continuum was designed to
reduce the use of tasers in lower-level encounters, where suspects may only be exhibiting passive
resistance. Often, these types of encounters result from self-initiated, consensual police-citizen
encounters, such as traffic stops, or consensual encounters with suspects in high drug sales areas
(McBride & Tedder, 2005).
A variety of tools and weapons have been developed and implemented to aid police in
protecting themselves and in maintaining public order. A short summary of the history of these
tools is practical in any discussion of police use-of-force issues and, therefore, is presented
below.
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Traditional Police Tools Used to Keep the Peace
Historically, police have sought suitable tools to control the behavior of criminals. Impact
weapons were one of the first weapons sued by police. The “billy club,” also known as a
”truncheon” was issued to London's Bobbies in the late 1820s (Truncale, 1996). British police
leaders sought a weapon that was not immediately intimidating to citizens. The truncheon was
small enough to be concealed in the pocket of a coat or in trousers, but, when needed, it was
effective for rendering an unruly suspect compliant (Truncale, 1996).

Nightsticks, Flashlights, and Batons
Officers have been provided with a variety of impact weapons since the inception of
organized policing (Peak, 1990). The first police nightsticks or batons used by American police
were made of wood and were standard issue for most police departments well into the 1980s.
The next generation of baton was developed in 1958 by William Bailey and was known as a
monadnock™ or PR-24 baton. It had a side handle, which was mounted at a 90-degree angle.
This weapon was very effective and was adopted for use by police agencies throughout the
1970s and 1980s. It afforded officers a wider range of defensive techniques and an increased
capability to defeat an adversary in a hand-to-hand confrontation (Truncale, 1996).
The problem of portability for officers who must carry an array of equipment created the
need for the expandable baton (Ederheimer & Fridell, 2005). Expandable batons have only been
used by police since the 1980’s; they consist of metal tubes that lock into place with a snap of the
wrist. The disadvantage of expandable batons is that they may collapse with a hard strike to an
immovable surface. Expandable batons lack the durability of a traditional fixed baton. The latest
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styles of expandable batons are made from a combination of polycarbonate and metal and
automatically lock in place to prevent collapse (NIJ, 1998).
Flashlights have also been a standard issue with police since their inception. The
flashlight as a weapon of choice has at times been a topic of police research. Several incidents of
unnecessary force or even death have been attributed to police use of the flashlight as an impact
weapon. This use as a blunt force impact weapon remains controversial (Cox, Faughn & Nixon,
1985).

Firearms as a Law Enforcement Tool
Despite the fact that firearms were essential in the creation of the government of the
United States after breaking away from British rule, the use of firearms by police was not
immediately accepted by the citizenry of the newly formed United States (Villa & Morris, 1999).
The fear of a standing army and centralized authority had not abated since the revolution, and,
for many people, the police represented both. The uncertain role of police and the influence of
local politics made armed police an unpopular choice for most cities (Wadman & Allison, 2004).
Even though firearms were used regularly by criminals, and possessed by even ordinary citizens,
uniformed officers and watchman were not authorized to carry firearms in most major U.S. cities
until the middle part of the 19th century (Wadman & Allison, 2004). After the killings of several
officers by gun wielding criminals, the police in most metropolitan cities were issued revolvers
for self-protection (Bailey, 1995). New York City police officers were issued Colt .32 caliber
revolvers in the 1890s, and other east coast cites, such as Philadelphia and Boston, quickly
followed suit (Bailey, 1995). Some police departments, such as the Phoenix Police Department,
did not arm their police until 1911 (NIJ, 1998). It was not until the 1920 and 1930s that the
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arming of police gained widespread acceptance in America. The .32 caliber Colt revolver
remained the weapon of choice for most agencies well into the 20th century (Wadman & Allison,
2004).
As the frequency of police shootings increased during the 1960s and 1970s, many
agencies upgraded their weapons to more powerful revolvers (Bailey, 1996; NIJ, 1998). It was
not until the 1980s that police agencies began to transition from revolvers to semi-automatic
pistols for officers. This transition was in response to a wave of violent crime in most large
American cities during the 1980s, which left police feeling outgunned by their criminal
counterparts (Geller & Scott, 1992).
Several highly publicized and controversial fatal police shootings during this time period
sparked widespread civil unrest in several major U.S. cities (Kelling & Wycoff, 2001). These
controversies motivated police agencies to seek alternatives to deadly force for their officers.
These alternatives were manifested in the form of a wide range of tools and weapons designed to
incapacitate offenders, without inflicting unnecessary harm or death. Prior to this time period,
these weapons had been the exclusive purview of the military or the special weapons units within
most major police departments. The mainstreaming of these weapons to conventional police
forces was a significant change for most agencies. These options became known as less-thanlethal weapons (LTL).

Less-Than-Lethal Weapons for Police
There is substantial peer-reviewed research on the subject of non-lethal alternatives for
police (Geller & Scott, 1992; Homant & Kennedy, 2000; Lumb & Friday, 1997; McEwen &
Leahy, 1993; McEwen, 1997; Meyer, 1992; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Parent, 2000; Peak,
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1990). The term “non-lethal” weapon is often misunderstood or misinterpreted as being
euphemistic or an oxymoron. Most non-lethal technologies have inflicted lethal results if
improperly employed or under very unique circumstances (Lewer, 2003). For this reason, the
term “less-than-lethal” has been more readily accepted. Any use of force that is not designed to
kill could be defined as less-than-lethal. The traditional definition for less-than-lethal weapons
are those designed to render a suspect compliant using force less than is designed to be lethal
(Lamb, 1995).
Lamb (1995) posits that “nonlethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly
designed and employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities
and undesired damage to property and environment. Unlike weapons that permanently destroy
targets through blast, fragmentation, or penetration, nonlethal weapons have relatively reversible
effects on targets and/or are able to discriminate between targets and non-targets in the weapon's
area of impact” (p.1).
The concept of non-lethal weapons is also attractive to politicians. Most police agencies
responding to criticism about the use of deadly force have sought more humane methods for
dealing with unruly mobs, arresting violent criminals, and controlling emotionally disturbed
people (Lewer, 2003).
Less-than-lethal weapons were first introduced to law enforcement in the early 1970s
(Robin, 1996). The development of these weapons was motivated by historical events and
initiatives at both the local and federal level. The 1967 Presidential Crime Commission report,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, identified the need for police to seek alternatives to
deadly force. The 308-page report contained 200 recommendations for the development of
policies and technologies to fight crime. As a result of this report and its recommendations,
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millions of federal dollars flowed into crime fighting initiatives and technologies (Kelling &
Wycoff, 2001).
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Tennessee v. Garner (1985), which
prohibited police from using deadly force to apprehend unarmed or nonviolent fleeing felony
suspects, also fueled the development of alternatives to deadly force (Pilant, 1993). A subsequent
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report also called for the development of alternatives for police
in lieu of deadly force (NIJ, 1998). This spurred great interest in funding research for a wide
range of less-than-lethal alternatives for law enforcement officers. The Rodney King incident in
Los Angeles galvanized public opinion regarding excessive use of force by police and spurred
the creation of an independent city commission on use-of-force issues. The commission also
made recommendations that called for more alternatives for police to deal with nonviolent but
noncompliant offenders (Meyer, 1992). Various authors have cited the need for continued
expansion and exploration of less-than-lethal alternatives for police (Bailey, 1996; Garner et al.,
1996; Homant & Kennedy, 2000; Lumb & Friday, 1997; McEwen, 1993; McEwen, 1997;
Meyer, 1992; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Parent, 2000; Peak, 1990).
An analysis of policy development can provide insight into how policy on less-thanlethal (LTL) force has driven the development of LTL weapons and tactics. McEwen (1997)
reviewed the use-of-force policies from 96 law enforcement agencies. The study concluded that
LTL weapons policies influenced the levels of police shootings. The two significant findings of
this study were an increasing reliance on OC spray by officers in many police departments and
the identification of a significant number of agencies with inconsistent policies that define lethal
and non-lethal force. The significance of this study to the current area of investigation is that
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simply providing officers with this type of weaponry and training is insufficient (McEwen,
1997).
The effect of LTL weapons on the killing of citizens by police was the subject of a 1996
study. Bailey (1996) used national data for large U.S. cities for the year 1990 to examine the
relationship between the availability of various types of LTL weapons and the rates of policecitizen killings for the public, in general, and by race, in particular. This study found no evidence
that the availability of LTL weapons reduced the number of police killings of citizens. The
limitations of this report are its use of FBI data on justifiable homicide rates and the limitations
of the data that indicate the availability of LTL weapons by the agencies chosen (Bailey, 1996).

Modern Less-Than-Lethal Weaponry
A wide range of LTL options and tactics have been developed that provide alternatives
for officers to employ when dealing with unruly or combative violators. These options can be
deployed against individual suspects who are resisting police actions, or in situations involving
multiple suspects in a riot or civil disorder. A variety of LTL projectiles, such as rubber or
wooden bullets and gas munitions, have been developed for use on physically combative or
barricaded suspects, or for use in disturbances with multiple suspects. Typically, these options
allow the officer to deploy weapons against potentially armed or violent suspects at a safe
distance. Other options, such as impact weapons, chemical sprays, or electronic control devices,
are designed for use by a lone officer against single or multiple combative offenders in close
proximity. Each of these use-of-force options have strengths and limitations. A short summary of
the history of these weapons and a summary of the evaluative research of their use are presented
for illustration.
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Chemical Sprays
One LTL alternative that gained popularity with police is the use of chemical sprays. A
variety of chemical sprays have been developed and used by both the military and the police
since the mid-1960s. These include CN, CS, and OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) spray. CN gas
(Chloroacetaphenone), or tear gas, was introduced for police use in the 1960s. Its principle use
was in civil disorders or riots. It is an irritant that produces burning in the eyes, nose, and throat.
CS gas (Ortho/Chlorobenzal-Malononitrile), another disabling gas, also came into use during the
1960s and 1970s. CS gas causes pain in the nose, throat, and chest. It also can cause nausea and
vomiting, and it is considered more potent than CN gas (Alpert and Smith, 2000).
The latest chemical spray to be developed and used by police is (OC) spray. The original
versions of this spray developed in the 1980s were known as “mace” and were initially used by
the U.S Postal Service Carriers (Geller & Scott, 1992, p. 378). OC spray is derived from an
irritant in cayenne pepper and is one of the more popular and effective products on the market
today (Alpert & Smith, 2000; Meyer, 1992). The police have used it extensively since its
inception as a LTL weapon.
McEwen and Leahy (1993) estimate that 41% of the major public safety agencies in the
United States equip their personnel with OC spray. In a survey of 378 police and Sheriff’s
departments, McEwen and Leahy (1993) found that 65 percent of responding agencies issue
chemical sprays to their officers. Alpert and Smith (2000) also found that OC spray is widely
used by agencies with more than 100 officers. A number of studies have been conducted on the
use of OC spray by police. These studies have used a variety of methods to explain and evaluate
the use of OC spray.
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Case Studies of OC Spray Implementation
In one of the more comprehensive studies on the use of chemical spray, Morabito and
Doerner (1997) examined police use of OC spray in the Tallahassee, Florida Police Department
(TPD). The study used 563 use-of-force forms completed by the officers between 1993 and
1995. The results of the study revealed that the use of OC spray results in fewer and less severe
officer and offender injuries relative to impact weapons (batons and flashlights). OC spray was
effective only three-quarters of the time it was deployed; however it did neutralize a wide
spectrum of suspects. The level of effectiveness of OC spray in the study sample fell far below
the manufacturer’s claims for the type of spray used by the TPD. Morabito and Doerner (1997)
identified many of the strengths and weaknesses of the use of OC spray as a LTL weapon. The
fact that OC allows the officer to remain at a distance and still exercise some control over a
noncompliant suspect and the fact that injuries to officers and suspects are greatly reduced by
OC use is significant. The study also identified the tendency of officers to move into close
proximity with suspects who are believed to be armed or who appear to be more dangerous to
them. This would tend to be a detractor for the use of OC spray. It would seem to indicate a lack
of confidence in the spray by officers or an unwillingness to rely on it in these types of
confrontations. The lack of effectiveness of the OC product studied might also be relevant to this
line of reasoning. If the officers lacked confidence in the product, they might be less inclined to
use it in more serious or hazardous situations.
Kaminski, Edwards, and Johnson (1999) studied the use of OC spray by the Baltimore
County, Maryland, Police Department. The study examined 878 uses of uses of OC spray from
July 1993 to December 1996. Their findings indicated officers reported an 85 percent

42

effectiveness rate in making arrests. However, a much lower rate of effectiveness was noted with
mentally disturbed or intoxicated suspects.
The implementation of OC spray by a single agency was the subject of a study by Atkins
(2003). This study examined the use of OC spray by a medium-sized municipal police agency
between 1999 and 2001. Using primarily self-reported data, OC deployments were examined to
determine their effectiveness as a LTL technology for police. The results of the study revealed
that while the frequency of injuries to officers during the examination period decreased, the
number of excessive use-of-force complaints increased. The limitations of this study lie in its use
of officers' self-reported data and the inability of findings to be generalized to a larger population
(Adkins, 2003). This study, like many others, fails to resolve or address the central question:
Would officers have resorted to this level of force if they did not have OC spray available to
them? More succinctly, what effect(s) do the availability of LTL alternatives have on the levels
of force used and the number of excessive use-of-force complaints filed by citizens?
A study by Bowling and Gaines (2000) examined officer and suspect injuries and
excessive force complaints during the deployment of OC spray by officers in three North
Carolina law enforcement agencies during a two-year period from 1997 through 1998. The
agencies studied were the Winston Salem Police Department, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department, and the North Carolina State Highway Patrol. The study used self-reported use-offorce data by officers and queried suspect injury and excessive force complaint data information
from agency records. The study found the use of OC spray was associated with declines in the
number of injuries to NC Highway Patrol officers and complaints of excessive use of force. It
also found a strong association with OC use and reduction of injuries to suspects and overall
officer use of force in one of the agencies. The results of this study highlight the difficulty with
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generalizing any finding to the community of law enforcement. The data captured in the use-offorce forms examined did not relate the same information in a consistent way from all of the
agencies. The lack of consistent use-of-force and injury data from all of the study sites
contributed to the inability to link OC spray use to changes in the identified study categories
(Bowling & Gaines, 2000).
Another LTL tool that has gained popularity with law enforcement is the conducted
energy device, or electronic control weapon, or taser. Conducted energy devices, or electronic
control weapons, encompass a wide range of products and weapons that use electricity to
incapacitate a suspect. Electronic control weapons include the taser and stun guns.

Tasers
Taser technology has been in service with law enforcement agencies since 1974
(IACP, 2004). A number of articles are available from publications on specific taser products
(Nielson, 2001; Vogel, 1998; Williams, 2001). These articles primarily discuss product features
or innovations to specific models, or they track the progression in product development. These
publications do not specifically discuss or evaluate the effectiveness or characteristics of
operational taser deployments. A review of current literature reveals limited research on police
use of taser in conjunction with situational variables, such as suspect characteristics, the types of
incidents which lead to taser use, or the number of officers or bystanders present. There are a
limited number of research studies that examine taser use in conjunction with other LTL use-offorce methods. Several studies examine taser use by single agencies. A brief summary of these
studies is presented.
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Case Studies of the Use of Tasers
In one of the more comprehensive studies of use of force by a police agency, Meyer
(1992) evaluated statistics of taser, (OC) chemical spray, and a variety of other use-of-force
methods. The study examined 568 use-of-force reports from the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) during 1989. These incidents involved a variety of non-lethal tactics deployed on
suspects. These tactics included the use of batons, flashlights, karate kicks, punches, swarming
(several officers rushing the suspect), chemical sprays, and taser deployments. The injuries
sustained by suspects and officers from each type of force were compared. The suspects' injuries
were classified into three groups based on severity, using major, moderate, and minor categories.
The overall findings of this study were remarkable with respect to injuries inflicted by impact
weapons when compared to other types of use-of-force methods (Illustrated in Table 3).

Table 3: Officer and Suspect Injury Rates by Type of Force Used LAPD
Force type
Baton
Kick
Punch
Miscellaneous
bodily force
Flashlight
Swarm
Chemical spray
Taser
Total

Study
cases
143
47
36
143

Injury to
officers
23 (16%)
5 (11%)
13 (36%)
21 (15%)

Injury to
suspects
86 (60%)
12 (26%)
28 (64%)
66 (46%)

25
51
21
102
568

1 (4%)
8 (16%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
72(13%)

20 (80%)
12 (24%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
221 (39%)

(This table was created by collapsing data from tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 from Meyer, 1992)

The significance of this research study is that the rates of injury to suspects and officers
were shown to be significantly reduced when tasers or chemical sprays were used. The use of
45

other force methods resulted in increased levels of both officer and suspect injuries. This study
was one of the first practical studies to examine taser use in an operational context when
compared to other LTL use-of-force methods. The limitations of this study could be argued as
the relative low number (102 cases) of taser and chemical spray deployments.

The Effectiveness of Tasers
Meyer (1992), in his study of LAPD use-of-force reports, discussed effectiveness rates
for the individual weapons and techniques used. Meyer defined effectiveness as “if the
application of force ended the altercation” (Meyer, 1992, p. 16). According to Meyer (1992),
“there is overwhelming data to support the conclusions that non-lethal weapons are as effective
as other force types, and that the use of selected non-lethal weapons results in virtually no
serious injuries to officers or suspects” (p.16). The significance of this research is that it
compares a variety of non-lethal use-of-force methods by a common set of standards, i.e., rate
and severity of injuries and effectiveness.
The most-used types of force were the baton, the miscellaneous bodily force (pushing,
shoving, grabbing), and the taser. The least-used force types were the chemical spray, flashlight,
and punches. Meyer determined that the effectiveness rate of the baton was 85%, the “karate
kick” effectiveness rate was 87%, the punch rate was 75%, and the miscellaneous force rate was
94%. The flashlight rate was 96% and the swarm, or organized tackle, rate was 92%. The
chemical spray rate was 90% and the taser rate was 86%.
A similar study conducted in Henrico County, Virginia, examined a wide range of use-offorce methods for effectiveness. Using a self-reporting survey instrument, Smith and Petrocelli
(2002) captured responses on the effectiveness of multiple use-of-force tactics employed by
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officers making arrests during 1999. The focus of this research was on the officers’ use of a
sequence of tactics to gain control of suspects. The significance of this research lies in validating
the importance of officers progressing through multiple tactics to achieve higher levels of
effectiveness.
A 2002 study by the Seattle Police Department (SPD) examined data on taser use by SPD
during a 13-month period. The purposes of the study were to evaluate the effectiveness of the
M26 taser as a LTL option for SPD officers and to identify any future training or deployment
needs. The report concludes that the M26 Taser was effective in disabling offenders 92% of the
time it was used, provided that verified taser contact was obtained. This occurred in only 85% of
taser uses. The report documents that “Both officers and suspects reported low rates of injury
during taser incidents when compared with other use-of-force situations” (SPD, 2002, p.3).
A study by Hougland, Mesloh, and Henych, (2005) examined taser use at the Orange
County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office. The effect on civil litigation by taser deployments was one
area of their examination. Their study also examined the frequency of taser use and at what level
in the use-of-force matrix, or continuum, the taser was deployed. Their data indicates that, since
being implemented, the taser became the primary LTL weapon deployed by officers. Despite the
fact that agency policy allows for use at the passive resistance level of the Use-of-Force
Continuum, the taser was deployed more often (69%) in situations when officers encountered
active physical resistance (Hougland et al. 2005).
Despite the fact that some commonalities exist in cases where deaths occur from taser
use, it appears that more research is needed. Additional research is needed to clarify the
standards to be used to measure the effects of the taser that may cause unintentional death or
injury. A larger sampling of these types of cases should be reviewed to capture more of the
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variables affecting the analyses of the taser as a LTL weapon and to better assess the risks
associated with its use.

Suspect Injuries and Unanticipated Consequences of Taser Use
There is a body of research that examines the effectiveness of tasers in rendering suspects
compliant; however, there is limited medical research available on its effects on human subjects.
A 1991 study conducted by the Chief Medical Examiner in Los Angeles County which examined
sixteen deaths associated with taser use in Los Angeles County between 1983 and 1987 was
reviewed (Kornblum, 1991). The study presented a general profile of the victims, their age, sex,
and race. Also documented were specific behaviors exhibited when the police encountered them
and the manner of death (accident or homicide). The study specifically looked at whether or not
the suspect was found to be under the influence of illegal drugs, the time interval between the
taser deployment and death, and the number of taser cassettes fired. According to Kornblum
(1991), drugs, specifically cocaine, PCP, or amphetamines, were found in 13 of 16 cases. All of
these subjects sustained some form of injuries varying from a few superficial abrasions to
gunshot wounds. “…aside from the injuries sustained in the confrontation with police and the
use of the taser, these deaths vary only slightly from those caused by solely cocaine or PCP”
(p.445). This conclusion supports the position that the taser alone is not to blame for these
injuries.
A review of the injuries related to the use of tasers by the Portland, Oregon, Police
Department between June 2002 and July 2003 was conducted by McManus, Forsyth, Hawks, and
Jui, (2004). This study revealed that 42 percent of 227 taser deployments generated EMS reports.
During the study period there were no documented dysrhythmias or cardiac complaints and sixty
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of the patients (63%) had no documented injury. Minor secondary injuries (hematomas,
lacerations, and contusions) were documented in 27 (28%) of the patients. Nine (9 %) of the
patients sustained self-inflicted or unrelated injuries. McManus et al. (2004) concluded that “the
M26 taser appears to be a safe and effective non-lethal weapon” (p.587). Despite the fact that no
deaths were reported during their examination the authors note a higher incidence of injuries than
manufacturer reports claim.
Ordog, Wasserberger, Schalater, and Balasubramanium (1987) examined 218 patients
who were treated in an emergency room after being shot by police with a taser for violent or
criminal behavior in Los Angeles County between July 1980 and December 1985. Their report
found that complications associated with taser wounds included contusions, abrasions, and
lacerations in 38 percent of the cases examined. Another 1 percent suffered mild
rhabdomyolysis, or muscle breakdown, and a smaller (0.5) percent of suspects suffered testicular
torsion. According to the report, “Although 48% of ‘tasered’ patients required hospitalization, all
but one was for a preexisting injury or toxic or psychiatric problem” (p.78). The authors
concluded that tasers are relatively safe when compared to more conventional weapons (Ordog et
al., 1987).
A medical literature review conducted by Bleetman and Steyn (2003) concluded that the
medical risks of electronic weaponry compare favorably with those of more conventional
methods of controlling noncompliant and violent subjects. The risk factors for death in ‘tasered’
subjects appear to be no different from known risk factors for death in custody and include the
subjects' use of drugs and symptoms, such as exhaustion or bizarre behavior, that lead to the
arrest.
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Despite the limited numbers of deployments of tasers by its police forces in the United
Kingdom, some preliminary research into the use of tasers has taken place. A report by the
United Kingdom’s Defense Scientific Advisory Council’s subcommittee concluded that the risk
of life threatening or serious injuries from the M26 Advanced Taser appears to be very low
(DOMILL, 2004). It should be noted that most police use of tasers in the UK are by special units
within the Metropolitan Police Force, who are also equipped with firearms. This greatly
influences the types of situations where tasers are deployed in an operational context (Lewer &
Davison, 2006).
In the Taser Task Force (2005) study conducted by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office in
Orlando, Florida, a medical expert panel reviewed the medical literature offered by Taser
International, Inc., and numerous other independent studies during their investigation of taser
deployments by the Sheriff’s Office over a 5-year period. “The panel concluded the level of
electrical output or shock delivered by a taser is unlikely to cause serious or permanent injury”.
(OCSO Task Force, 2005, p.35).
In an attempt to mitigate injuries to suspects and to govern the use of tasers as a LTL
weapon, police agencies have developed organizational policies that provide guidance on the
prudent use of tasers. The placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum gives officers
instruction on what level of suspect resistance must be present to authorize the deployment of the
taser. The development and implementation of these policies regarding taser use represents a
significant challenge for police administrators. The policies that govern taser use have also
generated considerable public criticism and media scrutiny. As with any organizational policy
that deals with high-liability areas of police activity, the issues that drive the policy change are
often politically charged and force police leaders to confront difficult issues and make value
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judgments. A significant body of research deals specifically with the process and effect of policy
change. A significant part of this study will examine the effect of policy change related to the use
of taser and how it has affected taser use.

The Research on Organizational Policy Change
Organizational change in police agencies has been the subject of a large body of work by
various researchers. The majority of this work relates to macrostructural changes in
organizations and how they affect work performance, policy development, agency members’
perceptions, and effectiveness (Guyot, 1979; King, 2003; Thacher & Rein, 2004).
Other researchers have focused on the paramilitary structure of police agencies and how
it affects police organizational change (Auten; 1985; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Rasor, 1999).
Much of this research seeks to remedy the cultural resistance to change for police organizations.
According to Lingamneni (1979), “Police organizations and the individuals which make up those
organizations have tended to resist substantive changes recommended from both within and
outside their ranks” (p.25). Thus, police often are very resistant to changes to either
organizational structure or police procedures. This tendency leads to the development of policy
in a variety of unorthodox and complex ways.
While police have always been enamored with tools and weapons, one of the areas where
police have been resistant to change historically is the advent of new procedures, tactics, and
policies that guide their use. Mosher (1967), in his work on government reorganizations,
identified new technology, new equipment, and advancing knowledge as identifiable factors that
make change necessary. Regardless of the impetus for change using new procedures and tactics,
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various researchers have attempted to understand why, when, and how policy does (or does not)
change.
The dilemma faced by police officers when use of force is indicted is that, despite the
placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum, the officers, because of their core value,
conflict with trying to balance safety for all and, therefore, tend to use it when they see fit, even
if this conflicts with agency policy. The testing of the officer’s ability to balance these values
with when to use this type of nonlethal force is the focus of this research study.

Theoretical Framework for Organizational Policy Change
Thacher and Rein (2004) provide a theoretical framework for the study of the effects of
policy change on taser use and effectiveness. Their theory of value conflict and policy change
explicates government’s tendency to balance competing goals or striking trade offs among
values. They define values-oriented casuistry, or rationalization, as a form of moral taxonomy
that aids in values balancing. Stewert (2006) interprets this theory further by explaining how
“police departments, required to give their officers guidance on how to handle criminals
effectively without undue harm, often come up with case-by-case approaches on how to respond
to particular situations” (p. 184).
Taser use and the policies that guide its use must always attempt to balance competing
values involving the safety of the public and suspects, as well as the safety of the police officer.
The Use-of-Force Continuum provides an example of this values management casuistry.
Therefore, the Use-of-Force Continuum and the policies that guide its use represent the police
agencies’ attempts to manage the conflict, thereby maintaining safety for all.
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According to Thacher and Rein (2004) “policy actors eschew general decisions about
how conflicting values should be weighed; instead, they encourage and facilitate case-by-case
judgment about how decisions should be made, typically using analytical reasoning to do so”
(p.464).
Many forms of decision-making in government can be seen as casuistic responses to
problems of value choice, such as retirement policy, crime policy, and refugee policy. Policy on
the use of force by police also clearly qualifies as one of these areas. The use of LTL weapons
and the policies that guide their use attempt to “balance” the competing values of the public
safety, including suspects or bystanders, and the safety of the police officer.
The Use-of-Force Continuum is a practical example of this values management casuistry.
Bittner (1970) states that Use-of-Force Continuum guidelines are built upon the assertion that
police coercion is, and must be, situationally justified. According to Terrill (2005), “Situations
confronting officers may vary infinitely, but workable standards to be used on the street cannot
mirror that level of complexity and are limited by the … number of principles and categories”
(p.110).
The continuum is a taxonomy of appropriate levels of force to be used by officers
confronted by suspect resistance or violence. These policies represent the balancing of values
conflict. When making policy decisions, governments must weigh the risks versus the rewards of
determining appropriate levels of authorized police force. The Use-of-Force Continuum and the
policies that guide its use represent police policy makers’ attempts to manage the conflict
between these two competing values.
It is understood that police use of force is central to the police mission (Bittner, 1970,
1990). The appropriate proportional and incremental nature of that force is not as clear
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(Klockars, 1996). The Use-of-Force Continuum is an incremental guide for police officers to
employ when confronting noncompliant or resistive suspects. The movement of levels of force
up or down the continuum is a subjective decision based on many situational factors. Most of
these factors are external to the bureaucratic police-working environment. These can include the
suspect’s demeanor, the degree of danger to the officer, or the presence of a weapon. The
internal working environment is often referred to as the degree of license given to police officers
to use force (White, 2001). Police policy makers must apply a reasonableness standard as
interpreted by state and federal laws when creating or amending agency policies. Often, it is this
application of reasonableness that leads to a values balancing by policy makers. This balancing
typically comes in the form of implementing new policy or amending existing policies.
Thacher and Rein (2004) cite noted police scholar Carl Klockars, who discusses in great
detail the dilemma faced by police decision makers who must manage the use of force by police
applying the nebulous definitions of excessive or appropriate levels of force provided by
constitutional lawmakers (Klockars, 1996). It is these laws that predominantly must guide policy
development on police use of force. The question ultimately becomes “How can society
authorize the use of necessary force but eliminate the use of excessive force?” (Thacher & Rein,
2004, p. 477).
Much of the controversy surrounding taser use relates to the frequency of its use and the
specific situations when police officers should use it which is governed by the Use-of-Force
Continuum. The influence of external political forces on policymaking is a central concern for
policy change theorists. What is not clear is the role public scrutiny of police actions plays in
motivating and influencing the policy change or the effect on officers’ actions and perceptions.
This study will explore these questions by examining an organizational policy change related to
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police use of force. This change raised the level of suspect resistance required to justify the use
of the taser. By examining archival data and officer survey responses, this study will evaluate the
effect of policy change on taser deployments.
This policy change was made obstensively to limit the use of tasers on suspects who were
only passively resisting the actions of officers. Passive resistance is defined as refusing to
comply with the commands of officers but not offering physical resistance.the policy change was
also an attempt to mitigate injuries to suspects in lower intensity encounters. It was also made at
a time of significant public and media scrutiny of taser use and the injuries inflicted during
deployments. The intent of the policy makers was to balance the need to protect citizens’ and
officers’ safety while still maintaining order. This is a practical example of “striking trade offs”
or the values balancing that Thacher and Rein (2004) discuss in their theory on organizational
policy change.
Weighing the need to protect life but also preserve order is a cornerstone of the police
mission. This study uses Thacher and Rein’s (2004) theory as a framework for understanding if
the policy change relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum achieved the
theoretical balancing described in their values-oriented casuistry of the need to protect officers
but not unnecessarily risk injuries to suspects. Clearly more explicite testing is necessary to
quantitatively prove or disprove this theoritical framework.

Literature Review, Summary, and Conclusions
The data that is available on the use of tasers by police suggests that taser use is
beneficial at controlling noncompliant suspects, without inflicting serious injury, and rarely has
its use resulted in death. A review of current literature supports the effectiveness of taser use
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although there are no current studies that examine the effect that use-of-force organizational
policy changes can have on taser use. Much of the public controversy surrounding tasers focuses
on when and how often officers should deploy them (PERF, 2005).
In an attempt to mitigate public concerns and guide officers on the proper use of tasers,
many agencies have changed their policies on placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum based on the level of suspect resistance encountered. This has been done by raising
the level of suspect resistance required to authorize the use of tasers in a use of force encounter.
The effect of these policy changes on overall taser use has never been quantitatively evaluated or
measured. This research is designed to provide quantifiable evidence to explicate these
questions. Further research in this area can help to instill public confidence in law enforcement’s
ability to maintain order without inflicting unnecessary injuries to suspects.
Various studies have been conducted on the use of tasers by police and their effectiveness
as a LTL use-of-force method. To date, there are no studies that focus on organizational policy
and how a change in taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum influences taser use and
effectiveness. This study will examine one police agency’s taser use after a change in policy
designed to mitigate its use. The information gathered from this study will help to bridge the gap
between previous studies that have focused primarily on specific factors, such as civil litigation,
harm to suspects, and officer injuries. This study will examine the use of tasers during policecitizen encounters using use-of-force incident data to see how a change in organizational policy
has affected its deployment and how this core value conflict plays into this nexus. This study will
also use a survey instrument to gather responses from taser users related to their perceptions and
experiences with taser use.
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A thorough review of the literature reveals that anecdotal data exists that suggests that
taser usage is beneficial in preventing serious injury to suspects or officers and rarely has its use
resulted in death (Fish & Geddes, 2001; Hamilton, 1991; Kornblum, 1991; Meyer, 1992;
Nielson, 2001). What is needed in the literature are more studies that examine how
organizational policy changes related to its placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum can alter
the effectiveness of taser use.
Taser manufacturers have begun to market these weapons aggressively in the lay
community. One company, Taser International, has begun selling tasers to women by
showcasing them at home taser parties in much the same way as Tupperware products are
marketed and sold (The Associated Press, 2008). This trend, coupled with the increasing
influence of these weapons on the police mission, all but ensures that the current level of public
scrutiny of their use will continue. The media attention that recent injuries and deaths have
drawn has also fueled the controversy. Research into the effectiveness of taser use and
organizational policy changes could resolve many of the questions surrounding its use by police.
Additional research will give police administrators and the public information needed to make
informed decisions on the prudent use of public funds for these weapons. Further research will
provide guidance to police on policy development related to the taser. This research could also
help to instill greater public confidence in law enforcement’s ability to maintain order without
inflicting unintended harm to suspects or officers.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes
regarding the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum on taser deployments.
Officers’ perceptions of taser effectiveness after the policy change were also examined. The
question explored in this study is whether there is a relationship between officer attitudes related
to taser use and their subsequent perception of taser effectiveness.
This study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two separate time
periods, using archival use of force and officer survey data. This examination is crucial as much
of the debate and controversy regarding the use of tasers by police focuses on the circumstances
surrounding when police use tasers and what level of suspect resistance it is designed to defeat
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006).
After the introduction of newer and more powerful tasers in the early 1980s, many police
agencies integrated their deployment into the Use-of-Force Continuum at a level to be used when
suspects were only passively resisting the actions of the officer. The use of tasers in these lowintensity situations led to considerable media attention and public controversy (PERF, 2005). A
review of current literature reveals no empirical research on the placement of tasers into the Useof-Force Continuum. In response to this scrutiny and to mitigate citizen complaints, many police
agencies increased the required level of resistance by suspects from passive resistance to active
physical resistance before tasers were authorized to be deployed. To date, no research studies
have been conducted that examine this change in use-of-force policy to determine the effect it
has had on taser deployments.

58

For purposes of comparison, taser use-of-force data from two separate time periods was
examined. Use of force data from the period before the change in policy to a higher level of force
comprises the first data set for analysis. The second set of archival data examines data after the
change in policy to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several identified areas.
Survey data from actual taser users was collected to capture officer perceptions of organizational
change. This survey data was examined and compared to use-of-force forms to determine if
officer’s perceptions and the gathered archival data reflect similar patterns and findings. The
literature generates the research questions and hypotheses listed below.

Research Questions
Research Question 1: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of taser deployments?
Research Question 2: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment had on the level of suspect resistance encountered by officers?
Research Question 3: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of injuries to suspects from taser
deployments?
Research Question 4: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment had on the severity of injuries to suspects from taser
deployments?
Research Question 5: What effect has raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment had on the frequency of injuries to officers during taser
deployments?
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Research Question 6: Do officers report that the change in organizational policy on the
authorized level regarding the Use-of-Force Continuum, which outlines when the taser can be
deployed, has increased the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter?
Research Question 7: Do officers perceive that the change in organizational policy
relating to the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum, when the taser can be used, has
increased the risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter?
Research Question 8: Do officers perceive that raising the authorized level on the Useof-Force Continuum for taser deployment places the taser at an appropriate level of force for
most encounters?

Data
This study uses two sources of data: (1) agency use-of-force archival data and (2) survey
data from taser-equipped officers. The archival data were gathered from the Orlando Police
Department (OPD) during two separate 12-month periods. The purpose of this examination is to
analyze the effect on the frequency of taser deployments, injuries to suspects, injuries to officers
and levels of suspect resistance after changes in organizational policy that altered the placement
of tasers on the Use-of-Force Continuum.
The OPD in Orlando, Florida, was selected as the site for this research because of its size,
the length of time tasers have been in use, and the fact that the agency changed its policy
regarding placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum.
The OPD staffing as of 2005 is approximately 706 sworn police officers, or 3.2 officers
per 1,000 residents. The Police Chief is appointed by the Mayor, who is an elected official. The
City of Orlando occupies approximately 110 square miles and is located in Central Florida. The
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population in 2005 was 217,567 residents with a daily service population of approximately
320,000. The City of Orlando has experienced significant growth from 1996 to 2005 with the
population increasing 17%, or by 44,445 new residents during that period. Orlando is also one of
the most popular tourist destinations in the world, with 36 million people a year visiting the
area’s theme parks and attractions.
In 2005, the violent crime rate in Orlando was 17.47 incidents per 1,000 residents. The
rate of property crime per 1,000 residents was 83.77 (FDLE, 2005). Data on the population, the
changes in population between 1996 and 2005, the reported crime rate, and the fluctuation of
crime rates over time for the City of Orlando was examined.
Several other major cities in Florida were also examined and comparisons were made in a
variety of categories to determine how Orlando compares with other similar sized metropolitan
cities. This data supports that in a majority of these categories, which measure growth, crime
rates and police service delivery measures, the City of Orlando compares favorably with that of
other major cites in Florida (See Table 4).
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Table 4: Florida Police Department Comparison
Police Department

Orlando

Miami

Tampa

Ft.
Lauderdale
31.7
1996:
150,150
16,972
25,484
31
1,186
17.19
152.53

Hollywood

112.1
1996:
289,337
14,817
42,871
41
2,671
30.02
118.15

St.
Petersburg
59.6
1996:
241,276
10,016
24,165
24
1,371
22.65
77.50

Square Miles Served (2006)
1996:
Population Served
Crime Rate per 100,000
Total Crime Index
Homicides
Robberies
Violent Crime per 1,000
Property Crime per 1,000

110
1996:
173,122
13,895
24,055
13
1,080
23.17
115.83

35.7
1996:
365,127
14,493
52,918
124
5,139
32.84
112.09

2000:
Population Served
Crime Rate per 100,000
Total Crime Index
Homicides
Robberies
Violent Crime per 1,000
Property Crime per 1,000

2000:
185,951
12,030
22,369
21
1,044
21.11
99.18

2000:
362,470
10,968
39,756
66
3,077
21.73
87.95

2000:
303,447
11,095
33,666
38
2,183
21.03
89.92

2000:
248,232
8,220
20,404
14
990
16.23
65.97

2000:
152,397
8,387
12,782
13
760
11.56
72.31

2000:
139,357
6,900
9,616
3
424
7.76
61.25

2005:
2005:
2005:
2005:
2005:
2005:
217,567
386,882
326,519
253,902
171,344
Population Served
Crime Rate per 100,000
10,124
7,613
7,650
7,980
7,423
Total Crime Index
22,027
29,455
24,978
20,260
12,719
Homicides
22
54
20
30
15
Robberies
1,204
2,019
1,160
959
741
Violent Crime per 1,000
17.47
15.84
14.42
15.51
8.77
Property Crime per 1,000
83.77
58.88
62.08
64.29
65.46
Sworn Officers
706
1,103
984
552
454
Sworn per 1,000
3.2
2.64
3.02
2.18
2.65
Sources: FDLE Total Index Crime for Florida, Jurisdiction and Offense, 1996, 2000, 2005
Violent crime – homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault
Property crime – burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft)
Sworn officer data FDLE 2005, Criminal Justice Agency Profile

2005:
143,025
5,084
7,271
6
330
5.40
45.43
326
2.28

27.3
1996:
125,689
9,973
12,535
10
502
9.21
90.52

In January 2001, OPD adopted the taser as a less-than-lethal alternative. To date,
approximately 700 tasers have been issued to police officers. The OPD also equips their officers
with OC Chemical Spray and ASP expandable batons as less-than-lethal use-of-force
alternatives.
The OPD requires the completion of a defensive tactics form by the first-line supervisor
after each taser deployment (See Appendix B). The content of the form is reviewed by multiple
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managers, and copies are sent to the Internal Affairs and Training sections. The use-of-force
report form requires the supervisor to document the level of resistance offered by the suspect and
the level of force used to compel the suspect into compliance. Additional demographic
information on these forms includes the officer’s name, age, and tenure with the agency.
Demographic information about the suspect is also captured, including name, race, sex, date of
birth, home address, and physical condition prior to the incident. Several situational variables are
also required on the form. These include whether the suspect was intoxicated; if the suspect had
prior or new injuries; if medical treatment was required; the incident type; the date, time, and
physical location of the incident; the number of involved officers; and the presence of citizen
bystanders.
Survey data was also used to examine the perceptions of officers related to the effect of
the change in organizational policy on taser deployments. The officers surveyed were selected
from a sample of taser-equipped officers. The officers were identified through the examination of
the archival data, and they must have used a taser during both of the time periods examined in
this study.

Procedures
Archival Data
Archival taser use data for the June 4, 2003 through June 3, 2004 (Pretest) and June 5,
2004 through June 5, 2005 (Posttest) time periods were compared. These data collection dates
reflect the timetable for implementing the change in agency policy that requires officers to use
the taser only when the encounter involves active physical resistance, on their Use-of-Force
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Continuum. This organizational policy change took place on June 4, 2004 for the OPD (see
Figure 1).

Figure 1: Timeline for Archival Data Analysis

These data collection time periods capture use-of-force incidents that occurred one year
before and one year after the organizational policy change regarding taser placement in the Useof-Force Continuum. OPD officers are guided on the use of tasers, also listed as electronic
control devices (ECD) 1 , by agency policy 1128.6, which governs the use of force by Orlando
Police Officers. The policy contains a resistance and response continuum that consists of six
levels of resistance: indicators of resistance, verbal resistance, passive resistance, active
resistance, aggressive resistance, and deadly force resistance (see Appendix A). The continuum
also lists employee’s response levels, which coincide with suspect resistance. These include
employee presence, verbal directions, soft control, hard control, intensified techniques, and
deadly force. Within each response level on the form are required fields that denote specifically
which weapon or technique the officer deployed.

1

The Orlando Police department uses the term (ECD) electronic control devices to describe tasers. This term is

used interchangeably throughout this document.
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The OPD requires the officer’s supervisor to complete the use-of-force form if the
suspect required medical treatment or was admitted to or treated and released from the hospital.
A narrative portion requires the supervisor to describe the resistance offered and the suspect’s
specific actions. There is also a portion requiring supervisory comments on the use of force, and
the form must be signed by each level of the officer's chain of command. The form must also be
attached to a copy of the agency incident report, which is completed for each incident.

Survey Instrument
A survey instrument for capturing officer perceptions of the effect of the policy changes
on taser deployments was developed (See Appendix C). Prior to administering the survey
instrument to the selected sample of officers, a pretest sample of three officers from OPD and
two deputies from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office were asked to take the survey and
comment on its clarity and ease of completion. Feedback was obtained from each of these
participants and changes were made to the survey instrument. The majority of their comments
pertained to the length of the instrument and recommended changes in wording to some of the
questions. This process was done to guarantee that the content validity of the survey was
maintained (Babbie, 2001).
The revised instrument was then administered to a sample of 333 OPD officers. The
officers chosen to participate in the survey were identified by examining the archival use-offorce data and selecting officers who deployed tasers during both the pre and posttest periods.
Only those officers who deployed a taser during these time periods and who were still employed
by the OPD, were chosen to participate in the survey.
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University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained in
June 2007 (See Appendix D). The survey instrument was administered via electronic mail using
Internet-based survey software that delivered the survey instrument to the officers at their agency
e-mail addresses. This method was chosen because this is the customary way for Orlando police
officers to receive agency information and correspondence. This also was used to improve the
response rate and the quality of responses. The identities of the respondents are known only to
the researcher and will not be divulged. Respondents were provided access to the survey
software through an online Web site link for an eight-week period, beginning July 7, 2007 and
ending September 1, 2007.
The recipients were provided several opportunities to participate in the survey. The
survey instrument was originally sent to recipients on July 7, 2007. A second message with the
survey Web site link was sent on August 1, 2007 to those recipients who had not previously
responded, and a final reminder message was sent to any additional recipients that had not
responded on August 21, 2007. Once officers submitted their responses to the survey instrument,
they could no longer access the web site. No surveys were received after August 27, 2007. A
timeline is presented in Table 5 to depict when surveys were received.

Table 5: Timeline of Receipt of Survey Responses
Date that surveys were received
July 7, 2007 – August 1,2007
August 2, 2007 – August 21, 2007
August 22, 2007 – September 1, 2007
Total

Total number of
surveys received
104
27
12
143*

% of surveys
received
73%
19%
8%
100%

* 13 surveys were excluded from the sample due to missing data leaving the survey sample at 130.
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The survey instrument consisted of an informed consent form and forty questions that
captured officers' perceptions of how the change in organizational policy relating to taser
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum has effected their safety and the safety of suspects in
use-of-force encounters. The survey also captured the officers' demographic information, such as
education level; job assignments during the archival data study period; rank during the test
periods; agency tenure; and previous employment in law enforcement. A variety of subject areas,
such as risk of injury to suspects, risk of injury to officers, the proper placement of the taser on
the Use-of-Force Continuum and the effectiveness of the taser in subduing noncompliant or
combative suspects were examined using officer survey responses.
To assist the reader in understanding the composition of officers who were surveyed,
Table 6 illustrates the comparisons between the survey sample, the sampling frame and the
population of officers employed by the Orlando Police Department. An analysis of these data
reveals that the survey sample contained responses from 11 (8.5%) Black officers, 99 (76.2%)
White officers, 14 (10.8%) Hispanic officers, 4 (3.1%) Asian officers, and 6 (4.7%) Native
American or other officers. The demographics of the Orlando Police Department are 137
(18.9%) Black officers, 454 (62.8%) White officers, 107 (14.8%) Hispanic officers, 21 (2.9%)
Asian officers, and 4 (.6 %) Native American or other officers. These data and the officer
demographics from the archival use of force data and OPD are presented in Table 6.
Data on similar sized police agencies was also examined. Using data provided by the
United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics survey (LEMAS) (2003) a comparison with the data from OPD was conducted. The
officer racial and gender demographics of police agencies that serve populations from 100,000-
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249,999 are as follows: Black (11.9%), White (76.0%), Hispanic/Latino (9.1%), and Other 2
(3.0%). The percentage of officers by gender is 89.0 % male and 11.0% female. This
examination revealed that OPD employs more Black and Hispanic officers and fewer White
officers than the national average for cities of similar size. The number of Asian and Other
officers were comparable. The percentage of female officers is also slightly higher that the
national average for similar sized agencies.

Table 6: Sample Demographic Comparisons
Variable

Value Labels

Race of Officer

Black
White
Hispanic
Asian/Other

Gender of Officer

Male
Female

Survey Sample
N
%
11
8.5
99
76.7
14
10.9
5
3.9
129
100.0
119
11
130

91.5
8.5
100.0

Force Population
N
%
66
19.8
229
68.8
24
7.2
14
4.2
333
100.0
293
40
333

87.9
12.1
100.0

OPD Population
N
%
137
18.9
454
62.8
107
14.8
25
3.5
723
100.0
606
117
723

83.9
16.1
100.

As shown in Table 6, Black officers were less likely than expected to respond to the
survey. Similarly, white officers appeared to respond more often than the sampling frame would
predict. In order to test if there are significant differences in these key demographic variables a
chi-square test was run on these key demographic variables. This test is important to make sure
that the respondents chosen match or are at least representative of the population sampled. In
this case, since the sampling frame was officers from OPD, that used a taser in this time period.

2

The other category includes Asians, Native Hawaiians, or other Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska

Natives, and any other race.
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Comparisons are also made between the survey sample and those that used force during the
archival data period and the entire population of OPD officers. The first comparison tells us if
there is a representative sample. The second comparison examines how well the sampling frame
compares to the larger population of officers employed by OPD. And the final comparison
examines how well the sample compared to OPD in general. While each of these comparisons
shed light on the sample, the critical one is the initial test that compares the sample to the sample
of officers who used force.

Table 7: Chi-Square Test for Difference in Populations of Officers in Opposing Samples
Variable
Race

Samples Compared
Survey Sample to Force Population
Force Population to OPD
Survey to OPD

Gender

Survey Sample to Force Population
Force Population to OPD
Survey to OPD
* Difference is significant at the .05 for a two tailed test

Chi Square
9.47*
12.29*
11.38*

Sig.
.024
.006
.007

df
3
3
3

1.2
3.13
5.15*

.272
.076
.023

1
1
1

As shown in Table 7, there are significant race differences between each of the
populations. It appears that since fewer blacks and more whites responded to the survey this
would indicate a possible problem with the representativeness of the sample. However, when the
gender composition of the samples is examined, there is no difference between the survey
sample and the sampling frame, for the sampling frame and the population of OPD. The only
difference is between the survey sample and the general population of officers employed by
OPD. This difference is likely the result of the difference in the overall population sizes between
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these two samples and the way a chi square test calculates the differences in the frequency
expected for each cell.
Despite finding that there is a difference in the racial composition between the three
samples and a difference in the gender composure between the sample and the general
population of officers employed by OPD, the chi square test tells us little about where the
differences occur. A cursory examination of Table 6 shows where these differences are likely to
be (black & white). To confirm this casual observation, a Z-test for the differences in proportions
was conducted. The results are depicted in Table 8.

Table 8: Z-Test for Difference in Proportions of Officers in Opposing Samples
Variable

Variable
Label

Survey to Force
Population

Race

Black
White
Hispanic
Asian/Other

Z
-2.92*
1.69
1.27
.159

Sig.
.003
.090
.200
.873

Gender
Male/Female
1.10
.272
* Difference is significant at the .05 for a two tailed test.

Force
Population to
OPD
Z
Sig.
.333
.738
1.857
.059
-3.48*
.000
.598
.550
1.77

.076

Survey to OPD
Z
-2.88*
3.058*
-1.18
.237

Sig.
.004
.002
.236
.812

2.27*

.023

The Z test for the difference in proportions extends the chi-square test analysis by
examining specific categories and identifying exactly where there is a difference. As shown in
Table 8, this test (z=-2.92, p=.003) statistically confirms that black officers were
underrepresented in the survey sample compared to the sampling frame. This is an issue that
needs further discussion. While blacks responded to the survey less often than would be expected
given the sampling frame and which raises questions regarding the representativeness of the
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sample, it does not mean that the survey results can not be used. The extant literature on the use
of force is fairly consistent in finding that not only are black officers more likely to be deployed
in areas where force is used more often, but they also use force on average more often than
whites (Alpert, Dunham & MacDonald, 2004; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1979, 1987, Reiss, 1971).
While this literature has not been extended into the use of taser per se, we can infer that it is
likely that if black officers use force more often, then it is likely that they will also be more
accepting of a wide variety of force options including the use of tasers. In fact, when looking at
the basic demographics of officers who used tasers, 15 percent of the force situations involved
black officers in the pre-test and 21 percent of these same incidents involved this group in the
post test. Further, blacks only comprised 8.5 percent of the survey sample and 19.8 percent of
officers that were in the sampling frame who used force. What shows is that black officers
apparently used tasers more often than expected. Using this logic, it is likely that despite the fact
that fewer back officers responded to the survey, the survey results may in all likelihood be a
conservative estimate of the true opinion of officers because black officers may be more
approving than their white, Hispanic or Asian peers. This however is an open empirical question
and one that needs to be addressed by future research.
A review of data comparing officers who used taser to the officers at OPD reveals that
there where fewer Hispanic officers who used tasers than expected. This finding may indicate
that these officers were assigned in different places within the police department and had less
opportunity to use tasers. The analysis comparing the survey respondents to all OPD officers
reveals that there are fewer black officers, and more white officers that responded than one
would expect just by looking at the racial composition of OPD.
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An analysis of officer gender between the three groups was also conducted. There are no
difference in gender between the survey sample and the force population (z=1.10, p=.272), nor is
there any difference between the officers who used force and OPD (z=1.77, p=.076). However,
there is a difference in the gender composition of survey respondents and OPD (z=2.27, p=.023).
This difference can be explained because only officers who used a taser in this time period were
sampled and it doesn’t appear that female officers used them as often as male officers.

Research Design
Study Variables Archival Data
This explanatory research design identifies the independent variable as the change in
organizational policy on taser use. The dependent variables are the frequency of taser
deployments; the level (severity) of suspect resistance encountered by officers; the frequency of
suspect injuries; the severity of suspect injuries; and the frequency of officer injuries related to
taser use. Table 9 provides definitions for these dependent variables.
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Table 9: Definitions of Study Variables—Archival Data
Variable Name
Taser frequency
before policy change

Variable
type
Continuous

Description

Data Source

Total number of taser deployments
during the specified period/total # of
arrests
Total number of taser deployments
during the specified period/ total #
of arrests
1 passive resistance
2 active physical resistance
3 aggressive physical
resistance
4 deadly force resistance
1 passive resistance
2 active physical resistance
3 aggressive physical
resistance
4 deadly force resistance
0 no injury
1 injury

Pre-existing
data/defensive tactics
forms
Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Taser frequency after
policy change

Continuous

Suspect resistance to
taser before policy
change

Ordinal

Suspect resistance to
taser after policy
change

Ordinal

Officer injured before
policy change

Dichotomous

Officer injured after
policy change

Dichotomous

0 no injury
1 injury

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Suspect injured before
policy change

Dichotomous

0 no injury
1 injury

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Suspect injured after
policy change

Dichotomous

0 no injury
1 injury

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Severity of suspect
injury

Interval

1 no injuries
2 standard injuries
3 abrasions, scratches
4 lacerations
5 hospital treatment required

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Study Variables Survey Data
The study variables relating to the survey instrument capture officer perceptions in a
variety of subject areas related to the effect of the policy change on the risk of injury to suspects,
the risk of injury to officers, the proper taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum, and the
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effectiveness of the taser in subduing noncompliant or combative suspects. Table 10 provides
definitions for these specific variables.

Table 10: Definitions of Study Variables—Survey Data
Variable Name
Variable type
Officer perception— Ordinal
increased risk to officer
after policy change
Officer perception— Ordinal
proper placement of
taser on Use-of-Force
Continuum
Officer perception— Ordinal
decreased frequency of
taser use after policy
change
Officer perception—
less able to control
suspects after policy
change

Ordinal

Officer perception— Ordinal
placement of OC at
level 4 appropriate for
most use-of-force
encounters

Description
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree Somewhat
3 Uncertain
4 Agree Somewhat
5 Strongly Agree
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree Somewhat
3 Uncertain
4 Agree Somewhat
5 Strongly Agree
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree Somewhat
3 Uncertain
4 Agree Somewhat
5 Strongly Agree
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree Somewhat
3 Uncertain
4 Agree Somewhat
5 Strongly Agree
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree Somewhat
3 Uncertain
4 Agree Somewhat
5 Strongly Agree

Data Source
Officer
Survey responses

Officer
Survey responses

Officer
Survey responses

Officer
Survey responses

Officer
Survey responses

Control Variables
Control variables for this study are situational level variables obtained from the use-offorce encounters. These include suspect age, sex, and race; the number of other officers present
during the encounter; the presence of citizen bystanders; the seriousness of the encounter; and
whether or not the incident was a call for service or a self-initiated contact. These variables are
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consistent with research designs used in other studies of police use of force (Riksheim &
Chermak, 1993; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Table 11 provides definitions for these control
variables.

Table 11: Definitions of Control Variables
Variable Name
Suspect race

Suspect gender
Suspect age

Variable type Description
Nominal
1 Black
2 White
3 Hispanic
4 Asian
5 Other
Nominal
1 male
0 female

Data Source
Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Interval

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Number of officers present Interval

Number of citizen
bystanders

Interval

The type of incident that
led to the use-of-force
encounter

Interval

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3

under 12
13-17
18-20
21-29
30-44
45-59
60+
one
two
three
four
more than four
none
one
two
three
four
more than four
Low threat
Medium threat
High threat

Officer-initiated or call for Dichotomous 1 Self initiated by officer
police service
0 Call for police service
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Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms
Pre-existing data/
defensive tactics forms

Analysis of the Data
The unit of analysis for this study is use-of-force encounters. Existing use-of-force data
was examined to form data sets in each of the identified categories. The research questions were
addressed by first determining the types and frequencies of the force levels employed and
resistance levels encountered in each incident. This strategy is consistent with research designs
employed by Croft (1985), Meyer (1992), McLaughlin (1992) and Garner et al. (1996).
This analysis examined two separate sets of data to determine if the change in
organizational policy had an effect on taser use and the outcomes of the encounter. The first data
set was archival in nature and was coded directly from the use-of-force forms maintained by the
OPD. The second data set was a survey consisting of multiple questions designed to see if the
perceptions of officers matched the reality of actual use. These data sets are explained more fully
in Chapter 4. The statistical methods discussed below were used to analyze the data

Z Test for the Difference in Two Proportions
The Z test for the differences in two proportions is designed to determine whether there is
a difference between two population proportions and whether one is larger than the other. This
test was applied to the data for the frequency of taser use in the pretest and posttest groups. To
test the null hypothesis that the two proportions are equal a two-tailed test is used. A one-tailed
test is used when trying to determine if one proportion is greater (or lower) than another
(Weisburd, 1998).
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Chi Square Tests
The Pearson’s Chi square test is a nonparametric statistical test that seeks to determine if
two or more variables are distributed equally. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no
association of the identified variable data (Norušis, 2005). Chi square testing was done on the
research questions relating to the frequency of injuries to suspects and the frequency of injuries
to officers. These questions both use nominal level variables. This testing method also was
applied to certain nominal-level individual and situational variables.

Independent Samples T Tests
An independent samples t-test is used to compare the mean scores of two different groups
of people or conditions to determine if there is a significant difference between the groups.
Independent samples t tests were conducted on the research questions relating to the levels of
suspect resistance and the severity of injuries to suspects (Norušis, 2005). Both of these variables
were treated as interval-level variables consistent with the framework laid out by Menard (1995).
Menard claims that categorical variables such as Likert scales can be treated as interval level
data if: (a) people believe them to be interval; (b) there is a true ordering to the data; (c) you
have more than two categories and (d) the data are normally distributed. This testing method also
was applied to certain interval-level individual and situational variables.

Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Ordinary Least Squares Regression were applied to the research questions relating to the
levels of suspect resistance and the severity of injuries to suspects, both of which were treated as
interval-level variables. The use of the regression test extends the bivariate analysis already
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provided by t tests. This test allows for identifying when a change in the nature or direction of
the relationship occurs when the effects of significant variables are controlled (Menard, 1995;
Schroeder et al, 1986; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).

Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes
regarding the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum on deployments and
officer’s perceptions of taser effectiveness. Officers’ perceptions of taser effectiveness after the
change in placement for authorized taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum were also
examined. The question explored in this study is whether there is a relationship between officer
attitudes related to the use of force regarding the taser and their subsequent perception of taser
effectiveness. This study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two separate
time periods, using archival use of force and officer survey data.
This study uses two sources of data: (1) agency use-of-force archival data and (2) survey
data from taser-equipped officers. The archival data were gathered from the Orlando Police
Department (OPD) during two separate 12-month periods. These data collection time periods
capture use-of-force incidents that occurred one year before and one year after the organizational
policy change regarding taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. The OPD in Orlando,
Florida, was selected as the site for this research because of its size, the length of time tasers
have been in use, and the fact that the agency changed its policy regarding placement of the taser
on the Use-of-Force Continuum. OPD compares favorably with other large metropolitan police
agencies of similar size and composition.
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Use of force data from OPD before the change in policy to a higher level of force
comprises the first data set for analysis. The second set of archival data examines data after the
change in policy to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several identified areas.
Survey data from actual taser users was collected to capture officer perceptions of the effect on
taser use after the organizational change. This survey data was examined and compared to useof-force forms to determine if officer’s perceptions and the gathered archival data reflect similar
patterns and findings.
Survey data was also used to examine the perceptions of officers related to the effect of
the change in organizational policy on taser deployments. The officers surveyed were selected
from a sample of taser-equipped officers. These officers were identified through the examination
of the archival data, and they must have used a taser during both of the time periods examined in
this study.
This chapter has described the methodology and research plan for this study, including
the examination of use-of-force forms to capture archival data, the development of the survey
instrument, the selection of the survey recipients, and the plan for distribution of the survey to
officers. Chapter 4 describes the data used in this study, both from archival use-of-force data and
data acquired through the user survey. In addition, Chapter 4 reports on the analyses of these data
in the empirical tests of this study’s hypotheses.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Problem Statement and Significance of Research
The use of tasers by police has been the subject of considerable debate and scrutiny since
their introduction as a less-than-lethal weapon in the late 1970s (IACP, 2004). This controversy
has been revitalized with the introduction of a newer generation of weapons in the late 1990s
(Cronin & Ederheimer, 2006; McBride & Tedder, 2005). These weapons are more powerful and
have been deployed extensively by police agencies across the United States and abroad. There is
a limited body of research on the use and effects of tasers. The majority of this research focuses
on the effectiveness of tasers and how frequently they are deployed in use-of-force encounters. A
review of current literature reveals no empirical research on the placement of tasers in the Useof-Force Continuum. Additionally, no research studies have been conducted that examine this
change in use-of-force policy to determine its effect on taser deployments or officers’ attitudes
related to taser effectiveness.
This study attempts to fill this void by examining taser use prior to, and after the
implementation of, a policy change on taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. In
practice, it is obvious that police leaders have attempted to mitigate and manage the use of tasers
by modifying organizational policies particularly related to high-risk situations to protect officers
or suspects. The mechanism that most police agencies use to guide officers in use-of-force
encounters is the Use-of-Force Continuum (Conner, 1991).
The purpose of this research study is to examine the effects of an organizational policy
change that alters the taser placement in the Use-of-Force Continuum. Using archival use-offorce and survey data, this study examines one agency’s experiences with tasers during two
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separate time periods. The period one year before the organizational change in policy that altered
the placement of the taser on the resistance and response continuum to a higher level of
resistance will comprise the first data set for analysis 3 . The second set of archival data examines
data one year after the policy change to determine what effect, if any, the change had on several
identified variables. To attempt to capture officer perceptions of organizational change, survey
data from taser users was also collected. This data will be examined to determine if officers'
perceptions and actual taser use statistics reflect similar patterns and findings.

Archival Use-of-Force Data
The policy change that is the subject of this study was made in an attempt to decrease the
use of tasers in low-intensity encounters by increasing the level of resistance that must be present
to authorize deployment. Essentially, the change raised the level of resistance from passive
resistance to active resistance. This means that suspects must be actively resisting the actions of
the officer—by pulling away or fleeing, not just passively resisting—for a taser to be deployed.
For the purposes of this examination, data was captured both before and after the policy change.
During both of the identified time periods for analysis 890 use-of-force incidents with a
taser were recorded by Orlando police officers. This data was separated into two samples,
labeled Pretest and Posttest. In the period between June 4, 2003 and June 3, 2004, one year prior
to the policy change (Pretest), officers recorded 523 taser uses. In the period between June 5,
2004 and June 5, 2005, one year after the policy change (Posttest), officers recorded 367 taser

3

The terms resistance and response continuum are unique to the OPD when referring to their Use-of-Force

Continuum. This terminology is used interchangeably throughout this study.
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uses. Descriptive statistics for situational level characteristics of the suspects are presented in
Table 12 below.

Table 12: Situational Level Variables—OPD Use-of-Force Report Data—Pretest/Posttest
Variable Value
Suspect Race
Black
White
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Total

Total Sample
N
Pct

Pretest
N

Pct

Posttest
N

Pct

461
315
111
2
1
890

51.8
35.4
12.5
.2
.1
100.0

273
189
61
0
0
523

52.2
36.1
11.7
0
0
100.0

188
126
50
2
1
367

51.2
34.3
13.6
.5
.3
100.0

820
70
890

92.1
7.9
100.0

474
49
523

90.6
9.4
100.0

346
21
367

94.3
5.7
100.0

Suspect Age
Under 12 3
13-17
50
18-20
88
21-29
383
30-44
278
45-59
60
60+
6
Unknown 22
Total
890

.3
5.6
9.9
43.0
31.2
6.7
.7
2.5
100.0

3
26
61
211
168
38
3
13
523

0.6
5.1
12.0
41.4
32.9
7.5
0.6
2.5
100.0

0
24
27
172
110
22
3
10
367

0
6.5
7.5
47.3
30.0
5.4
0.8
2.6
100.0

Suspect Gender
Male
Female
Total

Test Statistic Sig. Value
x2=5.178

.270

x2=3.958

.047*

T=.164

.870

The descriptive statistics on the individual-level suspect variables were unremarkable. As
expected, the majority of suspects encountered in use-of-force encounters were males (92.1%).
Unformed Crime Report data and prior research have found that males are involved in 80 % of
all violent encounters (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Garner et al. 1995, 1996; Terrill &
Mastrofski, 2002).
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An examination of the suspect race and age data revealed that a majority of suspects
(51%) were Black, (35%) were White, (12%) of the suspects were Hispanic and (.3 %) were
Asian or Other. The majority of suspects (43%) were between 21-29 years of age. Only (5%) of
the suspects were juveniles.
As shown in Table 12, there does not appear to be an appreciable difference in the
situational-level variables related to the suspects between the two reporting periods. Both the age
(T=.164, df=866, p=.870) and race (chi square value=5.178, df=4, p=.270) of these individuals
appeared to be relatively the same. However, tasers appear to have been used less against
females in the period after the policy change than before. This difference is statistically
significant (chi square value=3.958, df=1, p=.047). It is probable that since females are not as
likely to engage officers in hand-to-hand fighting, officers may have been less prone to use these
electronic devices in use-of-force scenarios, especially after this shift in policy.
For comparison purposes, key situational variable data relevant to the police-citizen
encounters are presented in Table 13. These data are stratified by the period in which they
occurred. The table illustrates these subdivisions and tests to see if there is a significant
difference between the two periods based on these situational variables, using either chi-square
or t-tests. Chi square tests were run on the variables suspect injured, officer injured, and officer
self-initiated variables. Chi square tests were used to determine if the nominal variables in the
study models are related. Independent sample t- tests were used to conduct means testing. A ttest was run on number of officers, suspects and citizens present, severity of suspect injury, level
of suspect resistance and threat level as these were treated as interval-level variables.
Individual-level variable data on the officers involved in police-citizen encounters are
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also presented in Table 13. Chi square tests were run on the variables officer gender and officer
race. T-tests were run on the variables officer tenure and officer age.

Table 13: Situational Level Variables—OPD Use-of-Force Report Data—Pretest/Posttest

Variable
Value Label
Officers Present During Encounter
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Number of Suspects
1
2
3
4
Total
Officers Injured
No
Yes
Total
Suspect Injured
No
Yes
Total
Suspect Injury Type
No Injury
Standard
Scratches and
Abrasions
Lacerations
Medical Treatment
Total
Suspect Resistance
Passive Resistance
Active Resistance
Aggressive Resistance
Deadly Force
Total

Total
Pretest
Posttest
Sample
N
Pct
N Pct N Pct Test Statistic Sig. Value
603
221
53
11
2
890

67.8 354 67.7 249 67.8
24.8 130 24.9 91 24.8
6.0
34 6.5 19 5.2 T =-.225
1.2
4
.8 7 1.9
0.2
1
.2 1
.3
100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0

868
18
3
1
890

97.5 508 97.1 360 98.1
2.0
12 2.3 6 1.6
0.3
2
.4 1
.3 T=1.093
0.1
1
.2 0
0
100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0

839
51
890

94.3 499 95.4 340 92.6 x2=3.059
5.7
24 4.6 27 7.4
100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0

.080

243
647
890

27.3 139 26.6 104 28.3 x2=.337
72.7 384 73.4 263 71.7
100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0

.562

243
439
148

27.3
49.3
16.6

47
13
890

5.3
23 4.4 24 6.5
1.5
5
1.0 8 2.2
100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0

139 26.6 104 28.3
268 51.2 171 46.6
88 16.8 60 16.3 T=-.929

46
5.2
38 7.3 8 2.2
713 80.1 427 81.6 286 77.9
126 14.2 57 10.9 69 18.8 T=-4.847
5
0.6
1
.2 4 1.1
890 100.0 523 100.0 367 100.0
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.822

.275

.353

.000*

Total Sample
Variable
Value Label
N
Pct
Threat or Seriousness of Encounter
Low Threat
274
30.8
Medium Threat 458
51.5
High Threat
158
17.8
Total
890
100.0

Pretest
Posttest
N
Pct N Pct
170 32.5
267 51.1
86 16.4
523 100.0

104
191
72
367

Test Statistic Sig. Value

28.3
52.0 T=-1.576
19.6
100.0

Number of Citizen Bystanders
0
1
2
3
4
More than 4
Total

563
156
89
46
24
4
890

63.4
17.7
9.8
5.2
2.5
1.3
100.0

342 65.4 221 60.2
91 17.4 65 17.7
49
9.4 40 10.9
23
4.4 23 6.3 T=-1.820
10
1.9 14 3.8
8
1.5 4 1.1
5235 100.0 367 100.0

Officer Self Initiated
yes
no
Total

473
417
890

53.1
46.9
100.0

276 52.8 197 53.7
247 47.2 170 46.3
523 100.0 367 100.0

Male
Female
Total

841
49
890

94.4
5.6
100.0

503 96.1 338 92.0
20
3.9 29 8.0
523 100.0 367 100.0

Black
White
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Total

158
625
71
29
7
890

17.8
70.3
7.9
3.3
.7
100.0

80 15.3
378 72.3
41
7.9
23
4.4
1
.1
523 100.0

1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-30
30+

N
54
146
58
61
13
1
333

Pct
16.3
43.8
17.4
18.3
3.9
.3
100.0

.115

.069

x2=.071

.790

x2=6.893

.009*

Officer Gender

Officer Race

Officer Tenure

85

78
247
30
6
6
367

21.2
67.4 x2=15.868
8.2
1.6
1.6
100.0

T=.700

.003*

.484

Variable
Officer Age

Total Sample
Value
21-25
26-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61+
Total

N

Pct

Test Statistic Sig. Value

2
27
167
117
19
0
333

.6
8.1
50.1
35.1
5.7
0
100.0

T=.951

.342

According to the extant literature, one of the prime determinants of the nature of policecitizen encounters involves situational-level elements. In fact, Freidrich (1980) separated his
analysis into three different levels (individual, situational, and organizational) and found that
situational-level variables are oftentimes the most important. These situational variables include
data on the suspect (race, gender, age or size) and data on the type of encounter (self-initiated,
felony crime in progress, or traffic stop). Individual level variables typically involve data related
to the officer (tenure, levels of education) or officer demographics. Hence, it is prudent to
examine these situational-level variables across both time periods to see if there is a difference
between them. If there is a difference, it could indicate that tasers are being used almost
exclusively in very dangerous situations. However, if there is no difference, it could be an
indicator that these contextual variables play little role in an officer's decision to use this lessthan-lethal weapon.
In this regard, it is prudent to examine the number of officers present at a given
encounter. A high number of officers tends to indicate a tense situation where there is likely to be
a possibility of injury to either the officer or a suspect. However, when we examine the data,
there does not appear to be any difference in the number of officers present at these use-of-force
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encounters. T-tests were run to confirm this and failed to reach the required level to claim that
there were appreciable differences regarding this variable (T =-.255, df=888, p=.822).
Data on the number of suspects present during an encounter was also examined. This is
also an important factor as the number of suspects present might be a significant influence on the
level of force used. Again, t-tests were run to confirm this and failed to reach the required level
to claim that there were appreciable differences related to this variable (T =-1.093, df=887.992,
p=.275).
As far as injuries to officers were concerned, these data indicate that officers were not
injured any more frequently in the posttest period. A chi square test was run, and it was
determined that there was no higher probability of officers being injured in the posttest period
(chi square value =3.059, df =1, p=.080). This finding does not reach the level of statistical
significance at the .05 level. Given the small sample size ( N=890), a larger sample of archival
data might produce a different result. Further research with a larger sample is needed to more
thoroughly investigate this research question.
Data on the frequency of suspect injury were also examined. The data indicate that the
difference in the percentages of suspect injury was not statistically significant. In fact, when a chi
square test was run, there was no difference in the likelihood of a suspect being injured either
before or after the change in policy (chi square value =.337, df =1, p=.562). This is likely
because all of those who are in the sample suffered the same type of injury from the penetration
of the taser darts.
Additional data were collected on the nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the
suspects. Treating this variable as an interval-level measure since there was some ordering to the
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data, a t-test was run and it confirmed that there was no statistical difference in the severity of the
injuries suffered in either period (T=-.929, df =721.935, p=.353).
Also examined were data on suspect resistance. The pattern clearly shows that suspects
tended to resist at higher levels in the posttest period, which was consistent with the
organizational change in policy that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum
when tasers can be used. Based on t-test results, the difference is statistically significant at the
.05 level (T=-4.847, df =749.620, p =.000). An examination of data on the level of suspect
resistance reveals that in 8 uses of force incidents in the posttest group (after the change in
policy) the suspects were resisting at a passive level of resistance when a taser was deployed.
Anecdotally, this would seem to indicate that the use of tasers in these low intensity incidents
violated the agency policy. The incident data reveals that 7 of the 8 events occurred within four
weeks of the policy change between June 5, 2004 and July 6, 2004. This may indicate that some
officers had not yet adjusted to the policy change or that a training issue could be to blame.
There was no distinct pattern or other common variables in these events. Each of these incidents
involved different officers. The types of incidents that led to these uses of force were from a
variety of low, medium and high threat level encounters. Half of these incidents involved officer
self initiated action and the other were dispatched. These incidents only comprise 2.2% of the
total posttest data.
The effect of threat level or seriousness of the encounter was also examined. The level of
threat encountered by officers was not found to be statistically significant, which was confirmed
by t-tests (T =-1.576, df=888, p=.115). It was not expected that the threat levels would change
between the pretest and posttest groups. The data examined relating to police activity remained
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very constant between the three threat level categories, with the majority falling into the low or
medium threat-level categories in both the pre and posttest groups.
Data on the presence of citizen bystanders were also examined. Using a one-tailed
solution, a significant difference in presence or number of citizen bystanders was found. In this
case, there were more citizens present in the typical posttest use of force incident than in the
pretest, indicating the situations where tasers were used were more likely more serious and had a
higher probably of escalating to a more violent and volatile encounter. This was determined by a
t-test (T =-1.820, df=745.311, p=.069). A one-tailed solution was used because prior research has
identified the presence of citizens as having an effect on the levels of police force, this was not a
significant factor in this data set. This finding could also be explained by the increased public
awareness of the controversy surrounding taser use by police. It is possible that taser usage by
police may have aroused more public curiosity after the media attention regarding its use. This
would account for the presence of more citizen bystanders in the posttest group.
The influence of officer self-initiated contacts versus dispatched calls for service was also
examined using a chi square test (chi square value = .071, df =1, p= .790). An analysis of this
data indicates that there was no statistically significant difference in the levels of officer selfinitiated or dispatched calls for service in either the pretest or posttest groups.
These preliminary analyses show that, for the most part, there are very few differences in
the situational characteristics (suspect race, gender, and age) or the characteristics related to the
incident (number of officers present, number of suspects present, officers injured, suspects
injured, suspect injury type, suspect level of resistance, threat level of the encounter, number of
citizen bystanders present, and whether or not the encounter was officer-initiated or a call for
service) in the encounters between the pretest and posttest. The only major differences between
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these variables appeared to be with suspects; namely, officers generally used taser less against
females.
Various research studies have examined the influence of officer demographics on policecitizen encounters (Garner et al. 1995, 1996; Terrill, 2001, 2003). The influence of individual
level variables related to officers involved in use of force encounters were also examined in this
study. Officer age, gender, race and agency tenure were all examined to determine if the
influence of these variables was statistically significant. There does not appear to be a
measurable difference in the individual-level variables related to the officers’ age and experience
between the pretest and posttest periods. Both the age (T=.951, df=888, p=.342) and tenure
(T=.700, df=888, p=.484) of the officers appeared to be relatively the same in the both groups. It
does appears that female officers used force 4.9% more often in the posttest group (chi
square=6.893, df=1, p=.009). Also found to be significant was the influence of officer race in use
of force encounters between the pretest and posttest groups (chi square=15.868, df=4, p=.003).
An examination of the data on officer race reveals that while white officers used force 4.9 % less
often in the posttest period, black officers used force 5.9% more often. This is an interesting
finding that warrants further examination and study. Use of force incidents by Hispanic, Asian,
and other officers did not significantly change. As far as the situational-level variables related to
event itself, officers appeared to use tasers, on average, more against suspects that were offering
more aggressive resistance, and where there was a crowd assembled.
The following research questions are related to the examination of the archival use-offorce data. By having some background knowledge of the sample data on use of force, this
allows us to move forward and begin testing the research questions of interest.
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Research Questions from Archival Use-of-Force Data
One of the principal concerns of taser use and one of the reasons why it generates public
interest is the issue of how often and when tasers are used in use-of-force incidents. The policy
changes that were implemented by the OPD were specifically designed to reduce taser use by
imposing more stringent restrictions as to when officers’ can use tasers. This makes examining
what effect the policy change has had on the frequency of taser use a significant area of study.

Research Question 1: Frequency of Taser Deployments
Research Question 1, related to the frequency of taser deployments, posited that raising
the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser deployment has decreased the
frequency of taser deployments. The related null hypothesis posed that raising the authorized
level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has had no effect on the frequency of taser use
by officers. The hypotheses for this research question are given below.
H01: Raising the authorized level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has had no
effect on the frequency of taser use by officers.
H11: Raising the authorized level for taser use on the Use-of-Force Continuum has
decreased the frequency of taser use by officers.
To address this question, one can simply count the number of deployments and see if the
raw frequency has increased. However, that would not provide the reader with an adequate
picture of the probability of true deployments because most use-of-force incidents usually
coincide with an arrest. If there were more arrests in the pretest period, then the raw frequency
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would be inflated. Thus, the only way to get an adequate picture and/or understanding of this is
to use a test that measures differences of proportions.
To address this research question, OPD call-for-service, arrest, and total uses of force
data during the pre and posttest periods was examined. During the pretest period, from June 2003
through June 2004, OPD officers handled 337,470 calls for service, made 19,267 arrests, and
used all types of authorized force in 707 incidents. This includes the use of OC spray, ASP
baton, and weaponless tactics such as strikes and takedowns. During the posttest period, from
June 2004 through June 2005, OPD officers handled 383,567 calls for service, made 19,770
arrests and used force in 572 encounters. The use of call-for-service, arrest, and use of force data
to address the question of the effect on frequency of taser resulting from the organizational
change is warranted based on the fluctuation in the crime rate and accompanying police activity
used to counter it during the analysis periods. An examination of Uniformed Crime Report data
for Orlando during the periods of analysis reveals a 3% reduction in the index crime rate per
100,000 populations between 2003 and 2004. It is important to note that only the six months of
June through December 2003 are included in the analysis period. The change in index crime rate
between 2004 and 2005 was recorded as a 3.5% increase (FDLE, 2003, 2004, 2005). The
analysis period ended in June 2005. These data are three such measures of that activity and are
used to demonstrate the overall increase in police activity during the study periods and then to
incorporate taser deployment data to test hypotheses on the effect of the organizational change
relating to when the taser could be used.
During the pretest period 523 taser deployments were recorded in use-of-force encounters
by officers. The numbers of taser deployments during the posttest period were 367, indicating
that the number of deployments dropped by 156 actual uses or 29 %. The total numbers of use of
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force by officers also decreased by 135 incidents, or 19%, from 707 to 572 in the pretest and
posttest periods. To analyze these data the proper way, a Z test for the difference in proportions
was applied to the arrests, calls for service, and total use of force encounter data in the pretest
and posttest samples. The results are illustrated in Table14.

Table 14: Z Test for Difference in Proportions in Taser Deployments in the Pre and Posttest
Periods Using Number of Arrests, Calls for Service, and Use of Force Data
Arrests
Z-Values
Critical Values

5.68
(1.65)

Calls for
Service
7.15
(1.65)

Total Use of Force
Encounters
3.83
(1.65)

The Z test for the differences in two proportions is designed to determine whether there is
a difference between two population proportions and whether one is larger than the other which
is a one-tailed test. To use this test, certain assumptions must be met. These are: (1) independent
samples, (2) a normal binomial distribution, and (3) a large enough sample size (np ≥ 5 and n[1p] ≥5 for each population). For purposes of this analysis, all of these assumptions have been met.

The following formula was used to compute the Z test:

Z = (p s1 – p s2) – (p1 – p2)
√ ׀p(׀1 – ׀p{ )׀1/n1 + 1/n2}
Figure 2: Calculation of the Test Statistic
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After computing the Z test using arrest data, the Z value was 5.68, and the critical value
was 1.65. Therefore, since the Z value was higher than its critical value, this result supports that
there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser uses/arrests between the pre and
posttest samples. After computing the Z test using call-for-service data, the Z value was 7.15,
and the critical value of Z was 1.65. Since the Z value was higher than its critical value, we can
also claim that there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser uses/call for service
between the pre and posttest samples. Using the same Z test analysis with total use of force data,
the Z value was 3.83, and the critical value of Z was 1.65. Since the Z value was higher than its
critical value, we can also claim that there is a difference in proportion between the ratio of taser
uses/total use of forces between the pre and posttest samples.
Using arrest, calls-for-service, and use of force data for analysis the findings are that
tasers were used more frequently in the pretest sample. This finding substantiates a reduction of
taser use in the posttest sample. A reduction in overall use of force incidents was also found.
Based on this finding, we can reject the null hypothesis and state that the change in
organizational policy related to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum may have had a
significant effect on the frequency of taser use. That change is a measurable reduction in the
frequency of taser use after the change in organizational policy.
The level of resistance offered by suspects in a use-of-force encounter is one of the
fundamental questions of this study. The policy change examined specifically raises the required
level of resistance that must be present for the taser to be used. The effect on levels of suspect
resistance after the policy change is the focus of the research question addressed below.
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Research Question 2: Level of Suspect Resistance
Research Question 2 posed if raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum
for taser deployment would result in deployments that are more serious when the suspect actively
resists the officer to a greater degree. The null hypothesis related to this question states that there
is no difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers after the change in
organizational policy. For this research question, the research and null hypotheses are:
H02: There is no difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers
after the change in organizational police.
H12: There will be a difference in levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers
after the change in organizational police.
An independent samples t-test and regression analysis was completed to test this
hypothesis. An independent samples t-test is used to compare the mean scores of two different
groups of people or conditions to determine if there is a significant difference between the
groups (Norušis, 2005).
Group statistics for pre and posttest results from the variable suspect resistance are given
in Table 15. These results indicate that the mean result for the pretest group was 2.04, with a
Standard Deviation (SD) of .434. The mean for the posttest group was 2.19, with a SD of .468.
The results for the independent samples t-test were significant at the .000 level, suggesting that
there was indeed a difference between the levels of resistance offered by suspects between the
two reporting periods. While it is easy to say that the means or distributions are different, it is
difficult to state that this one specific finding provides direct support to the hypothesis that the
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change in policy was the sole reason why suspects resisted less. However what would provide
more support is if the inclusion of additional correlates does not diminish the differences found
here. Hence, a multiple regression equation was run to check and make sure that higher levels of
resistance are not caused by some other factor. The use of a multiple regression test extends the
bivariate analysis. This also allows for identifying when a change in nature or direction of the
relationship occurs when the effects of significant variables are controlled. Typically, the use of
OLS regression with ordinal level dependent variables would not be the preferred method of
analysis. However, in this case OLS was used in lieu of Ordered Logit or Ordered Probit
Regression to make the interpretation of analysis results easier for the reader. This is supported
by Sturman (1996) who found that despite methodological expectations the use of OLS
regression does not produce significantly more false positives than expected. While an ordered
probit model appears to be a viable solution, it is not without problems. Aldrich and Nelson
(1985) and Menard (1995) claim that ordered probit estimates often produce predicted values of
the dependent variable that lie out of the range of the dependent variable. This happens for three
reasons. First, the formula under the proportional odds assumption assumes that changes in the
dependent variable will be stochastic across all cross-category comparisons within the dependent
variable. That is, the effect coefficient (and thus error terms) produced and simultaneously
estimated during the program's maximum likelihood iterations must be invariant across
categories both higher and lower to the predicted value. If heteroskedasticity is apparent within
an estimated model, errant values are likely. The second cause of problems using models with a
limited range dependent variable model, is that a series of extremely large or small values in one
of the explanatory variables may distort the distribution and variability of the residuals which in
turn will influence the model's predictive power (Aldrich & Nelson 1984; Schroeder et al. 1986).
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Third, Greene (1992) states that since the both the ordered probit and logit models depend
heavily on the cross-classification algorithm, the presence of non-empty cells may cause the
estimation process to either breakdown or produce faulty estimates. Thus, ordered probit does
not allow of stable and easy interpretation of the effect of explanatory variables on a limited
range dependent variable even if it does represent an underlying latent scale. This problem is
further exacerbated when the number of categories of the dependent variable exceeds three and
the number of independent or covariates exceed one. In these cases, it may be better to use
multiple regression, noting that the effect estimate of the independent variable is a conservative
estimate, although significant in the appropriate direction (Kennedy, 1992; Menard, 1995).
Bohnstedt and Carter (1971) and Busemeyer and Jones (1983) claim that ignoring the true
properties of ordinal level data and treating them an interval using some inferential methods
rarely effect the making of a Type I or Type II error.

Table 15: Group Statistics for Suspect Level of Resistance
Test Period
Pretest
Posttest

N
523
367

Mean
2.04
2.19

SD
.434
.468
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T-Value

Sig.

-4.784

.000

Table 16: Level of Suspect Resistance— Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Constant
Pretest or Posttest
Situational Characteristics
No. Primary Officers
No. Suspects
Citizen bystanders
Threat or Seriousness of
encounter
Suspect Injury Type
Suspect Sex
Suspect Black
Suspect Hispanic
Officer Characteristics
Officer Age
Officer Gender
Officer Tenure
Officer Race
R2=.075

b
1.842
.141

SE b
.165
.030

Beta

.054
.142
.014
.030
.066
-.059
-.060
.002
-.003
-.037
.000
.004
df = 13

.153

t
11.159
4.637

p
.000
.000

.022
.073
.013
.022

.081
.065
.036
.046

2.430
1.948
1.068
1.374

.015
.052
.286
.170

.017
.055
.033
.049

.128
-.035
-.066
.002

3.771
-1.071
-1.781
.049

.000
.285
.075
.961

.003
-.039
-.894
.066
-.019
-.562
.004
.003
.066
.022
.007
.197
F =5.478
F significance<.000

.372
.574
.948
.844

The model summary presents an R Square value of .075, which indicates that this model
is 7.5% better at estimating the value of the dependent variable by knowing the values of the
independent variables. The F-test confirms this assertion.
The multiple regression equation in Table 16 tests this hypothesis. In this model, we
include the variable representing the type of test as well as a series of other situational-level and
individual officer-level correlates of police force. Overall, the model is robust and represents a
significant increase in the explanatory power by the value of F (5.478) and its corresponding
significance value (.000). The results of the model suggest that, controlling for other factors
present, on average there were higher levels of resistance in the posttest period. Further, other
factors may contribute to the increased level of suspect resistance. These factors include the
number of officers and suspects present as well as the seriousness of injury inflicted upon the
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suspect. For each of these variables, the relationship is positive. Thus, the more officers and
suspects present at an encounter, or the more likely an individual is to receive serious injuries,
the more likely we are to see increased levels of force. None of the situational-level variables
related to officer characteristics were found to be significant indicators of suspect resistance.
The analysis findings indicate that a statistically significant difference in the level of
suspect resistance was present after the change in agency policy. The levels of suspect resistance
increased after the change in policy related to taser deployment. Based on this finding, the null
hypothesis is rejected, and a significant difference in the levels of suspect resistance encountered
by officers was observed after the change in organizational policy.
Another fundamental question of this study is what effect the policy change had on the
frequency of injuries to suspects. The safety of suspects in use-of-force encounters is a
significant issue for public safety organizations. The following question specifically examines
what effect raising the authorized level of resistance required for taser use had on the frequency
of injuries to suspects in use-of-force encounters.

Research Question 3: Frequency of Injuries to Suspects
Research question 3 posited if raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for taser deployment has resulted in a change in the number of injuries suffered by
suspects in police-citizen encounters. The null hypothesis related to this question states that
raising the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser deployment has resulted in
no change in the number of injuries suffered by suspects in police-citizen encounters. The
hypotheses for this research question are:

99

H03: There is no difference in the number of suspect injuries after the change in
organizational policy
H13: There is a difference in the number of suspect injuries after the change in
organizational policy
The results of a cross-tabulation of the data on Suspect Injuries in the pretest and posttest
groups are depicted in Table 17. To address this research question, a Pearson’s Chi square test
for independence was conducted using the Suspect injured nominal variable. The Pearson’s Chi
square test is a nonparametric statistical test that mathematically seeks to determine if two or
more variables are distributed equally. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no
association of the identified variable data. The Chi square test results also are depicted in Table
17.

Table 17: Chi Square Test for the Frequency of Injury to Suspects
Suspect Injured
Pretest
Posttest

No
139
104
243

Yes
384
263
647

Total
523
367
890

df
1

x2
.337

Sig.
.562

Based on the results depicted in Table 17, the Pearson Chi square value of .337 does not
meet the required level to be considered significant at the .05 level. Based on this result, the null
hypothesis is not rejected. This finding supports that there is no difference in the overall number
of suspects injured between the two reporting periods. Thus, it appears that the change in the
organizational policy concerning when tasers should be deployed has likely had no impact on the
number of suspects injured.
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The change in severity of injuries to suspects resulting from the policy change is another
important area for examination. How severely suspects are injured in use-of-force encounters is
one of the primary concerns of both the police and the public. One of the purposes of the Use-ofForce Continuum and the policies that guide its use are the reduction of injuries to police officers
and suspects. The effect on severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change is the focus of
the following research question.

Research Question 4: Severity of Injuries to Suspects
Research Question 4 addressed the issue of whether raising the authorized level of force
for using tasers has had any effect on the severity of injuries to suspects. This question is
different from the previous one in that it is not just asking if the raw number of injuries changed
after the change in policy, but, rather, it is looking to see if the severity of these injuries changed.
Since tasers would only be used in higher risk police-citizen encounters after the change in
policy, it is likely that the severity of these injuries would have, on average, increased. The
research and null hypotheses for this research question are:
H04: There is no difference in the severity of suspect injuries suffered by citizens in
police-citizen encounters after the change in organizational policy
H14 There is a difference in the severity of suspect injuries suffered by citizens in policecitizen encounters after the change in organizational policy
Group statistics for pre and posttest results for the Suspect injury type variable are
presented in Table 18. These results indicate that, for the pretest group, the mean was 2.02, with
a standard deviation of .835. The mean for the posttest group was 2.08, with a standard deviation
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of .949. An independent samples t-test and regression model were performed to test this
hypothesis.
As shown in Table 18, the results for the independent t-test indicate that there is no
difference in the level of suspect injury between the two reporting periods. Based on this finding
the null hypothesis is not rejected. This supports that, on average, the level or severity of suspect
injury between the reporting periods is roughly the same. No violations of normality were noted
between groups.
Since the t-test does not allow for examination of other control variables and how the
addition of these other variants may influence the test, a multiple regression model was run to
take these other factors into account. The use of a multiple regression model extends the
bivariate analysis. This allows for identifying when a change in nature or direction of the
relationship occurs when significant variables in the model are controlled.
Table 19 presents the results of the regression model using suspect injury type as the
dependent variable and using pretest and posttest, number of primary officers, number of
suspects, the number of citizen bystanders, threat or seriousness of encounter, suspect resistance,
suspect sex, suspect black, suspect hispanic, officer age, officer gender, officer tenure and officer
race as the independent variables.

Table 18: Group Statistics for Severity of Suspect Injury
Test Period
Pretest
Posttest

N
523
367

Mean
2.02
2.08

SD
.835
.949
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T-Value

Sig.

-.929

.353

Table 19: Suspect Injury Type— Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Constant
Pretest or Posttest
Situational Characteristics
No. primary officers
No. suspects
Citizen bystanders
Threat or seriousness
of encounter
Suspect resistance
Suspect Sex
Suspect Black
Suspect Hispanic
Officer Characteristics
Officer Age
Officer Gender
Officer Tenure
Officer Race
R2= .096

b
.893
.011

SE b
.339
.059

Beta

.123
.114
.098
-.062

.006

t
2.638
.192

p
.008
.848

.043
.140
.026
.042

.095
.027
.127
-.048

2.870
.812
3.825
-1.459

.004
.460
.000
.145

.243
.230
-.281
-.003

.065
.107
.064
.094

.125
.070
-.159
-.001

3.771
2.157
-4.403
-.032

.000
.031
.000
.974

.004
.265
-.011
.007
df= 13

.007
.126
.008
.043
F= 7.174

.028
.068
-.058
.005

.655
2.098
-1.336
.165
F significance<.008

.513
.036
.182
.869

The model summary presents an R Square value of .096, which indicates that this model
explains 9.6% of the total variance of the dependent variable. The F-test confirms this assertion.
Overall, the model is robust and represents a significant increase in the explanatory power by the
value of F (7.174) and its corresponding significance value (.008). When examining the
regression results, the significant predictors of the severity of suspect injury include the number
of officers and citizens at a scene, the level of suspect resistance, if the suspect was male, and if
the suspect was not of African American descent. The presence of more officers and bystanders
at a scene are likely to increase the severity of injury. Further, the more the suspect resists, the
more likely they are to be injured. The only predictor of severity of injury related to officer
characteristics was officer gender. An examination of the breakdown of officer demographics in
both the pretest and posttest data reveals that female officers used force 4.9% more often in the
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posttest group. Of critical importance in this model is that the levels of suspect resistance (pretest
vs. posttest) failed to reach the required level of statistical significance, thus confirming the
bivariate relationship tested by the earlier t-test.
One of the serendipitous findings in this model is related to the race of the suspect.
Suspects of African-American heritage experienced less serious injuries than those of other
races. This finding is difficult to interpret; however, what it appears to say is that it is possible
that this class may resist less and, thus, be less likely to be injured more seriously. This argument
is supported by the previous regression in that African-Americans were significantly less likely
to resist at higher levels when a two-tailed solution was employed (See Table 16). It may be that
this class of citizens have had tasers used against them in the past and, thus, appear to have more
experience with the efficiency of these weapons. This, however, is only conjecture and should be
tested by further research.

Research Question 5: Frequency of Injuries to Officers
Research question 5 posited a similar question. However, this question asked if raising
the level of force on the Use-of-Force Continuum changed the frequency of injury to officers.
This question is important because we would expect that after the change in policy regarding
where the use of tasers are viewed as appropriate, we would expect that the number of injuries to
officers would increase since the organization is limiting the available options for dealing with
potentially dangerous suspects. For this research question, the research and null hypotheses are:
H05: There is no difference in the number of officer injuries after the change in
organizational policy.
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H15: There is a difference in the number of officer injuries after the change in
organizational policy.
To address this research question, a chi square test of independence was conducted using
the nominal variable officer injured and the reporting period was run. The results of the crosstabulation are provided in Table 15. The data in this table reveal that officers were injured in
only 4.6 percent of the cases in the first reporting period. After the change in policy, however,
officers were injured in 7.4 percent of these encounters. While it does appear that officers were
injured more after the change in policy, this difference of 2.8 percent may not be different from 0
in a statistical sense. Hence, a chi-square test was run to test to see if this difference was large
enough to claim that there was a statistical difference in these two reporting periods. Table 20
provides the chi square test results.

Table 20: Chi Square Test for the Frequency of Injury to Officers
Officer Injured
Pretest
Posttest

No
499
340
839

Yes
24
27
51

Total
523
367
890

df
1

x2
3.059

Sig.
.080

Based on the results shown in Table 20, the Pearson chi square value of 3.059 is not
significant at the .05 level. As previously stated, while this finding does not reach the level of
statistical significance at the .05 level, a larger sample of archival data might produce a different
result. Further research is warranted to more thoroughly explore this research question.
Based on this finding the null hypothesis is not rejected. This supports that there does not
appear to be a difference in the number of officer injuries between the two reporting periods. The
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frequency of injuries to officers did not significantly change as organizational policy limited the
use of tasers to only those encounters involving higher levels of force.

Officer Survey Response Data
To capture data related to officers' perceptions of the effect of organizational policy
change and taser use, a survey instrument was administered to a purposeful sample of 333 OPD
officers. The officers chosen to participate in the survey were identified by examining the
archival use-of-force data and selecting officers who deployed tasers during both the pre and
posttest periods. Only those officers who deployed a taser during these time periods and who
were still employed by the OPD, were chosen to participate in the survey. From the total number
of officers contacted 130 completed surveys were returned, resulting in a response rate of 39
percent. (See Table 6 for a comparison of survey sample population and OPD population
demographics).
The survey instrument consisted of questions designed to capture officers' perceptions of
how the change in organizational policy relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force
Continuum has affected their safety and the safety of suspects in use-of-force encounters. The
survey also captured demographic information on the officers’ educational level, job assignments
during the archival data study period, rank, agency tenure, and previous employment in law
enforcement.
A series of survey questions were posed to officers in a variety of subject areas related to
the effect of the policy change on taser use and taser effectiveness. These questions asked how
the policy change effected: the risk of injury to suspects, the risk of injury to officers, the proper
placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum, and the effectiveness of the taser in
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subduing noncompliant or combative suspects. Table 21 provides the respondents' demographic
data.
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Table 21: Respondent Demographic Data from Survey Instrument
Variable
Value
Officer Race
Black
White
Hispanic

N

Pct

11
99
14

8.5
76.2
10.8

Asian
Other

4
1

3.1
.8

Missing
Total

1
130

.8
100.0

Officer Gender
Male
Female
Total
Rank in PD between 6/03 – 7/05
Police Officer
Master Police
Officer
Detective
Sergeant
Lieutenant
Skipped question

119
11
130

91.5
8.5
100.0

111
3

85.4
2.3

12
3
0
1
130

9.2
2.3
0.0
.8
100.0

Officer Age
N
Minimum age
Maximum age
Mean
SD

58
72
130

Assignment in PD between 6/03 – 7/05
Patrol
Tactical
Detectives
Narcotics
Motors
Skipped question
Total
Law enforcement officer tenure
N
130
Minimum Years 3
Maximum Years 33
Mean
11.4
SD
6.16

127
25
54
37.5
6.264

Worked for another L.E. agency?
No
Yes
Total

Variable
Value
Officer level of education
Less than high school diploma
High School Diploma or GED
Some junior college but did not earn
a degree
Associates Degree
More than two years of college but
did not earn a degree
Bachelors degree
Some graduate courses but did not
earn a graduate degree
Graduate degree
Skipped question
Total

44.6
55.4
100.0

Orlando Police Department
tenure
N
130
Minimum Years 3
Maximum Years 33
Mean
9.45
SD
5.2
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N

Pct

0.0
7
20

0.0
5.4
15.4

16
9

12.3
6.9

53
15

40.8
11.5

9
6.9
1
.8
130 100.0

109 83.8
4
3.1
12
3
1
1
130

9.2
2.3
.8
.8
100.0

Research Questions from Officer Survey Response Data
It is important to examine officer perceptions related to the key elements of this study to
compare how officers perceive the change has effected their safety, the safety of suspects, and
the effectiveness of the taser as a use-of-force method. Officer perceptions relating to these areas
are compared to the findings in the archival use-of-force data. By making this comparison, the
goal is for a better understanding of the aggregate effect of the policy changes on taser use and
effectiveness. Research question 6 asks officers their perception on whether or not the change in
organizational policy has increased the risk of harm to officers. The purpose of this analysis is to
see if officer perceptions match with the behavior depicted in the archival data from police useof-force encounters. The analysis of archival data revealed that the frequency of taser use by
officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers after the policy
change increased. There was no change in the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects as
result of the policy change. There was also no statistically significant increase in the frequency of
injuries to officers after the policy change. A comparison of the results of the archival data
analysis and the officers' perceptions will generate valuable findings for discussion and further
investigation.

Research Question 6: Officers' Perception of Increased Risk of Harm to Themselves as a
Result of Organizational Policy Change
Research question 6 asked if officers perceive that the change in organizational policy on
the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for when the taser can be used has increased
the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter. It is important to examine officer
perceptions related to the change in risk to them resulting from the policy change as this may
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have an effect on how frequently they deploy the taser and their level of confidence with it as a
use-of-force method. If officers feel constrained by the more stringent guidelines of the policy
change, they may opt not to deploy tasers and use some other method of control. It is also
important to compare the archival data on the frequency of injury to officers to see if it matches
with the archival data from use-of-force encounters.
H06: Officers express no preference regarding whether the change in organizational
policy relating to when the taser can be used increases the risk of harm to them in
a use-of-force encounter.
H16: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser
can be used increases the risk of harm to them in a use-of-force encounter.
Four questions on the survey instrument were asked to capture officers’ perceptions
relating to the increased risk to them from the change in agency policy. Officers were first asked
their level of agreement to the statement that: “The policy change relating to placement of the
taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum increases the risk of harm to you from
suspects during a use-of-force incident.” Table 22 provides the results for this question.

Table 22: Officer’s Opinions on Change in Policy Increasing the Potential Harm to Officers
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agreed
Strongly Agreed

N
Percentage
16
12.3
33
25.4
4
3.1
53
40.8
24
18.5
130
100.1
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error
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As shown in Table 22, the majority of the respondents, 59.3% (77), agreed or strongly
agreed with this survey question. This would indicate that a majority of the respondents
perceived that the organizational change that raised the level of resistance on the Use-of-Force
Continuum where taser use is authorized increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force
encounter.
A second question on the survey instrument asked officers their level of agreement to the
statement “Based on your experience would you say that being equipped with a taser makes you
safer when working as a police officer.” Table 23 provides the results for this question.

Table 23: Officers Opinions on Possession of Taser and Officer Safety
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agreed
Strongly Agreed

N
Percentage
5
3.8
7
5.4
8
6.2
38
29.2
72
55.4
130
100.0
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

As in the previous model, 84.6 percent of officers agreed with this statement. Their
opinion appears to show widespread support for the possession and possible use of taser by
officers in the course of their law enforcement duties. They believe that having this tool provides
for their safety and keeps unruly subjects away from them so that they do not have to engage in
manual combat tactics or resort to pulling their firearm.
A third question on the instrument asked officers their level of agreement with the
statement: “Based on your experience would you say that being equipped with an (ECD) taser
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makes you more confident in your ability to control noncompliant or combative suspects?” Table
24 provides the results for this question.

Table 24: Officers Confidence in Use of Taser for Controlling Noncompliant or Combative
Suspects
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

N
Percentage
7
5.4
16
12.3
4
3.1
55
42.3
48
36.9
130
100.0
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

As with the previous questions, the officers in this survey expressed confidence in the
taser and its ability to help them control combative or noncompliant suspects. Overall, 79.2
percent agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. This level of support was expected;
however, it was not expected that 17.7 percent, or approximately 1 in 5 officers, did not feel the
same way. It may be that these officers were involved in an incident that led to a disciplinary or
citizen complaint issue. Another possibility is that these officers do not believe that tasers are an
effective LTL weapon. Clearly, this is a question that needs to be explored in future research.
A fourth question on the instrument asked officers their level of agreement to the
statement “Based on your experience would you say that the change in agency policy relating to
placement of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum makes you more inclined
to other use-of-force options prior to deploying an (ECD)?” Table 25 presents the results for this
question and the officers’ level of agreement.
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Table 25: Officer’s Opinions on Using Other Force Options Prior to Using a Taser
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

N
Percentage
14
10.8
31
23.8
3
2.3
48
36.9
33
25.4
130
100.0
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

A majority of the respondents responded to this question affirmatively, with 62.3 percent
stating that they are more inclined to use other force options prior to deploying a taser. However,
34.6 percent stated that this change in organizational policy made little difference to them
regarding whether or not they would consider other options in the field. Thus, it may be possible
that many officers, or at least about a third of the officers in this sample, do not pay heed to the
placement of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum.
A synthesis of these survey responses indicates a strong preference for the taser as a useof-force method and a perception that it provides a significant measure of safety for officers
during use-of-force encounters. However, the results also demonstrate that officers perceive that
the policy change makes them more inclined to use other use-of-force options prior to deploying
a taser. It is also undetermined whether officers believe that the policy change decreases their
ability to control suspects who are resistive or noncompliant.
Based on these survey responses, the research hypothesis cannot be rejected. These
findings support that officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to taser
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum increases their risk of injury during a use-of-force
incident. The archival data related to the frequency of injury to officers revealed that there was
an increase in the frequency of injury to officers after the change in agency policy. The analysis
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of officers’ perceptions reveals that they believe that the policy change increases the risk of
injury to them during a use-of-force encounter. For this research question, the perceptions of the
officers do in fact match the findings of the archival data analysis.

Research Question 7: Officer Perception of Increased Risk of Harm to Suspects as a Result
of Organizational Policy Change
Research question 7 examined if officers believe that the change in organizational policy
relating to the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for taser use has increased the
risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter.
It is important to examine officer perceptions related to the change in risk to suspects as a
result of the policy change as this may have an effect on how often officers deploy the taser and
their level of confidence with it as a use-of-force method. If officers perceive that the more
stringent guidelines of the policy change may cause more severe injuries to suspects, they may
again defer to other use-of-force methods to avoid inflicting injuries and/or generating citizen
complaints. As in the previous research question, it is important to compare the archival data on
the frequency and severity of injury to suspects to see if it matches with the archival data form
use-of-force encounters.
H07: Officers express no preference as to whether the change in organizational policy
relating to when the taser can be used increases the risk of harm to suspects in a
use-of-force encounter.
H17: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser
can be used increases the risk of harm to suspects in a use-of-force encounter.
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Two questions from the survey instrument were asked to capture respondents’
perceptions relating to the increased risk of harm to suspects resulting from the organizational
policy change. Officers were asked for their level of agreement to the statement: “The policy
change relating to placement of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum
increases the risk of harm to suspect(s) during a use-of-force incident.” Table 26 presents the
results for this question.

Table 26: Officer’s Opinions on Change in Policy Increasing the Potential Harm to Suspects
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

N
54
33
8
25
10
130

Percentage
41.5
25.4
6.2
19.2
7.7
100.0

* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

A majority of the respondents, 66.9% (87) believed that the change in policy did not
negatively affect the safety of citizens involved in use-of-force encounters. However, (35) 26.9%
of the respondents felt that increasing the level of resistance before tasers could be used
increased the likelihood that citizens may be seriously harmed. While this percentage is higher
than what was found in the previous few runs, it may be that some officers are extremely well
acclimated to electronic control devices such as tasers and believe that limiting their use is likely
to mean that officers are more likely to be involved in hand-to-hand combat situations, where
there is a higher likelihood of serious injury.
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An additional question asked respondents for their level of agreement to the statement
“Based on your experience would you say that the change in agency policy relating to placement
of the taser (ECD) on the resistance and response continuum has increased the chances that a
suspect confrontation will escalate to deadly force.” Table 27 presents the results for this
question.

Table 27: Officers' Perceptions that Restriction on Use of Tasers Will Increase Chances that a
Confrontation Will Escalate to Deadly Force
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

N
Percentage
35
26.9
30
23.1
19
14.6
36
27.7
10
7.7
130
100.0
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

Officers in this survey were somewhat ambivalent as to whether or not the movement of
the use of tasers on the Use-of-Force Continuum was likely to increase the chances that a given
police-citizen encounter would escalate to a deadly force situation. Previous survey data supports
that a majority of officers support the use of tasers for dealing with unruly suspects and like to
have them in their complement of tools, it is likely that deadly force situations arise so
infrequently that it may be unreasonable to expect any consensus of opinion on such a rare event.
Although, when you examine all of those that disagreed (35.4%) and those that agreed (50%), it
is clear that, on the average, officers do consider these ECDs as a valuable tool in their arsenal
and one that may prevent a use-of-force situation from escalating.
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Based on these survey responses, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This finding
supports the notion that officers believe that the change in organizational policy relating to taser
placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum does not increase risk of injury to suspects during a
use-of-force incident. The archival data on the severity of injury to suspects revealed no
difference in either the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change. For
this research question, the officers’ perceptions appear to match the archival data findings.

Research Question 8: Officer Belief that the Placement of Taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum is Appropriate for Most Use-of-Force Encounters
Research question 8 examined the question of appropriate placement of the taser on the
Use-of-Force Continuum for most encounters. It is important to examine officer beliefs related to
the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum as a result of the policy change as this
may have an effect on their level of confidence with the taser as a use-of-force method. If
officers feel constrained by the more stringent guidelines of the policy change and do not believe
that the policy change appropriately places the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum for most
encounters, they may opt not to deploy tasers in favor of other use-of-force methods.
For this research question, the research hypotheses are:
H08: Officers express no preference as to whether the change in organizational policy
relating to when the taser can be used places the taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum appropriately for most use-of-force encounters.
H18: Officers perceive that the change in organizational policy relating to when the taser
can be used places the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum appropriately for
most use-of-force encounters.
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One question from the survey instrument captured the respondents' perceptions regarding
whether the change in organizational policy that increased the level of suspect resistance
required to deploy tasers was appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. Officers were asked
their level of agreement to the statement that “The placement of taser (ECD) at a level IV (active
resistance) on the resistance and response continuum is appropriate for most use-of-force
incidents.” Table 28 presents the results for this question.

Table 28: Officer Belief that the Placement of Taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum at Active
Resistance Level is Appropriate for Most Use-of-Force Encounters
Level of Agreement
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

N
Percentage
9
6.9
24
18.5
3
2.3
55
42.3
39
30.0
130
100.0
* Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding error

A majority of the respondents, 72.3% (94), agreed or strongly agreed that placement of
taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum at a level IV (active resistance) is appropriate for most useof-force encounters. This indicates that a majority of the officers supported the policy that places
the taser at a level on the Use-of-Force Continuum requiring active resistance for most use-offorce incidents.
Based on these survey responses, the null research hypothesis is rejected. The results of
this survey question supports that officers believe that the change in organizational policy
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relating to taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum places the taser at an appropriate
level of force for most use-of-force encounters.

Summary
This chapter presents an analysis of the data and research hypotheses related to the effect
of organizational policy change on taser use and effectiveness. Table 29 below displays a listing
of the research questions and related findings. Furthermore, an analysis of the archival data
suggests that after the policy change that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for deploying tasers, the frequency of taser use decreased. As expected, the levels of
suspect resistance after the policy change increased. An analysis of suspect injuries revealed that
there was no change in the frequency or level of severity of suspect injuries in the posttest
period. The frequency of injuries to officers did not increase after the policy change.
Survey response data from officers revealed that officers perceive an increased risk to
themselves as a result of the organizational policy change. However, officers perceive a
decreased risk of harm to suspects as a result of the policy change. Officers expressed a belief
that the organizational change placing the taser at a higher level on the Use-of-Force Continuum
is appropriate for most use-of-force encounters.
A discussion and summary of these findings is presented in the next chapter as well as
conclusions and recommendations for additional research.
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Table 29: Summary of Research Questions and Findings
Research
Questions
Question #1
Question #2
Question #3
Question #4
Question #5
Question #6
Question #7
Question #8

Subject

Accept or Reject
Hypothesis
Frequency of taser use
Reject Null
Hypothesis
Level of suspect resistance
Reject Null
Hypothesis
Frequency of injury to suspects Fail to Reject
Null Hypothesis
Severity of Injury to suspects
Fail to Reject
Null Hypothesis
Frequency of injury to officers
Fail to Reject
Null Hypothesis
Perceived risk of injury to officer Accept
Hypothesis
Perceived increased harm to
Fail to Reject
suspects
Null Hypothesis
Placement of taser on the Use-of- Reject Null
Force Continuum is appropriate Hypothesis
for most use-of-force encounters
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Summary of Findings
Frequency decreased
Suspect level of resistance
increased
No change in frequency of
injury to suspects
No change in severity of injury
to suspects
No change in frequency of
injury to officers
Officers perceive increase in
risk to themselves
Officers do not perceive
increase in risk to suspects
Officers believe that placement
is appropriate for most use-offorce encounters

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
This study examined one agency’s experiences with organizational policy changes
regarding taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum and officers’ perceptions of taser
effectiveness. Two different time periods were identified for analysis, constituting one year prior
to the policy change and one year after the policy change. In addition, a survey instrument
captured officers’ perceptions of taser use and effectiveness as it relates to the organizational
policy change, with additional survey questions related to the Use-of-Force Continuum as it
relates to the taser.
By examining both archival data and officers’ responses to survey questions, a clearer
understanding of the influence of policy changes on taser use and effectiveness has emerged.
This analysis was designed to see if officers’ perceptions coincide with the reality depicted in the
archival data from use-of-force encounters. A comparison of the results of the archival data
analysis and the officers’ perceptions generates important findings to stimulate discussion and
further investigation. This type of examination will produce a more comprehensive investigation
of the research questions and add academic rigor and value to the study’s findings and
conclusions.

Key Findings
When and how often police use tasers remain a focus for public debate and criticism.
Many police agencies have chosen to address these concerns by modifying their Use-of-Force
Continuum policy relating to when tasers can be deployed. The effect on the frequency of taser
use after the policy change was a primary question of this research study. A Z-test for the
difference in proportions was applied to the number of arrests, the number of calls for service,
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and the total number of uses of force in the year before the policy change and one year after.
These results revealed tasers were used more frequently in the one-year period prior to the policy
change. This finding also substantiates a reduction of taser use in the one-year period after the
policy change. Therefore, the findings support that the change in organizational policy related to
taser placement on the Use-of-Force Continuum did have a significant effect on the frequency of
taser use. This change resulted in a measurable reduction in the frequency of taser use after the
change in organizational policy.
The injury of suspects in a use-of-force encounter is also a primary concern of police
agencies. For this reason, the effect on frequency of injuries to suspects after the policy change
was also examined. An analysis of the archival data suggests that there is no significant
difference in the frequency of injury to suspects after the change in policy.
The severity of injuries to suspects was also a primary focus of this research. The effect
on severity of suspects’ injuries during use-of-force encounters after the policy change was also
examined. The results indicate that there was no significant difference in the severity of suspect
injuries after the change in organizational policy.
Another important component of police use-of-force is the protection of officers during
use-of-force encounters. Specifically, this research examined if injuries to officers occurred more
frequently after the policy change. Data analysis results support that there was no difference in
the frequency of injury to officers after the change in policy. The numbers of injuries to officers
did not change significantly, as organizational policy limited the use of tasers to only those
encounters involving higher levels of suspect resistance.
The level of suspect resistance in a use-of-force encounter is the primary determinant of
the amount of force police officers can use to counter it. This force response is mandated by the
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Use-of-Force Continuum. For this reason, the effect on levels of suspect resistance after the
organizational policy change was also examined. The results of these analyses support the
findings that there is a significant difference in the level of suspect resistance encountered by
officers after the change in organizational policy. These findings indicate that levels of suspect
resistance increased significantly after the policy change. Based on the structure of the Use-ofForce Continuum and the purpose for its existence, this finding is not unexpected. The Use-ofForce Continuum is a tool that guides the application of force, in incremental and proportional
levels, to raise or lower force levels as the level of suspect resistance changes during an
encounter. Therefore, since the policy change raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force
Continuum for when a taser can be deployed, it is only logical that suspect resistance levels
would also be greater. Officers are prohibited by their agency use-of-force policy to deploy
tasers when less than the authorized level of suspect resistance is encountered. This finding
supports that the organizational policy change produced the desired result, which was limiting
taser use in lower-level (passive resistance) encounters.
The severity of suspect injury also was significantly influenced by the level of suspect
resistance. This finding is reasonable based on the nature of use-of-force encounters and the
escalation of force used to overcome resistance. As the level of resistance encountered by
officers increased, so did the severity of the injuries incurred when force was applied to control
that resistance.
Several other control variables were also found to be significant. The number of primary
officers involved in the use-of-force incident was found to be significant. This would indicate
that the greater number of officers involved in the incident, the greater the influence on the level
of suspect resistance. Given the fact that multiple officers are often sent to more serious and
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potentially more violent encounters, this finding is logical and expected. The number of suspects
involved in the incident was also significant. This finding also seems intuitive since the greater
the number of suspects encountered in the incident, the more influence on the level of suspect
resistance would be expected. A greater number of suspects involved in an encounter would
indicate larger-scale disturbances or more serious crimes involving multiple offenders.
Officers’ perceptions relating to the potential of increased risk to them posed by the
policy change were captured in a survey instrument. Responses from these survey questions
support that officers’ believe that:
1. The change in policy increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force encounter.
2. Being equipped with a taser makes them safer when working as a police officer.
3. Being equipped with a taser makes them more confident in their ability to control
noncompliant or combative suspects.
4. The policy change makes them more inclined to use other use-of-force options prior to
deploying a taser.
These findings support a strong preference from respondents for the taser as a use-offorce weapon and a perception that it provides a significant measure of protection for officers
during use-of-force encounters. Despite this expressed confidence in the taser and the Use-ofForce Continuum as a guide for its deployment, a majority of the respondent’s still perceive that
the policy change increased their risk of harm during a use-of-force encounter. Respondents also
indicated that they are more inclined to use other use-of-force options before deploying the taser.
Officers’ perceptions relating to the potential of increased risks to suspects posed by the
policy change were also examined. Two survey questions were asked to capture officers’
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perceptions relating to the increased risk to suspects from the change in agency policy. The
officers believe that the policy change relating to placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum increases the risk of harm to suspects during a use-of-force encounter. Officers were
then asked if the change in agency policy has increased the chances that a suspect confrontation
will escalate to deadly force. Some ambiguity among respondents was noted regarding the effect
of the policy change and the potential for an encounter to escalate to the use of deadly force as a
result of the change in agency policy. Due to the infrequent and random nature of deadly force
events, this finding is not unexpected. These results support the finding that officers do not
perceive that the change in policy relating to the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum increases risk of injury to suspects during a use-of-force incident.
Officers’ perceptions concerning whether the policy change that raised the authorized
level of suspect resistance required for deploying tasers was appropriate for most use-of-force
encounters was the focus of this survey research. Survey responses support the finding that
officers believe the change in policy places the taser at an appropriate level of force for most useof-force encounters. Additional survey responses support that, in general, officers believe the
Use-of-Force Continuum and makes their job less dangerous.

Theoretical Implications
The theoretical framework for this study was based on the work of Thacher and Rein
(2004). Their theory of value conflict and policy change explicates government’s tendency to
balance competing goals or striking trade-offs among values. They define values-oriented
casuistry, or rationalization, as a form of moral taxonomy that aids in values balancing.
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The dilemma faced by police officers when use-of-force is indicated is that the placement
of tasers in the Use-of-Force Continuum often conflicts with the officers' core value of trying to
balance safety for all. In these situations, officers tend to use the taser when they see fit, even if
this conflicts with agency policy. The testing of the officers' ability to balance these values with
when to use this type of non-lethal force was the focus of this research study. The Use-of-Force
Continuum and the policies that guide its use are the mechanism used by police to manage useof-force encounters. The policies that guide taser use and, more specifically, the Use-of-Force
Continuum attempt to balance competing values of the safety of the public, including suspects,
and the safety of police officers. The findings of this study indicate that, by changing the
placement of taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum, the balance of safety between officers and
suspects relating to the frequency of injuries was essentially unchanged as a result of the policy
change. The policy change had no measured effect on the frequency of injuries to either suspects
or officers.
As expected, the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers increased as a result
of the policy change. Unfortunately, no measure of the change in the level of severity of injuries
to officers could be obtained from the archival data to conclusively resolve this question. The
frequency of taser use decreased as a result of the policy change, which resulted in an increased
level of safety for officers and suspects. In effect, the policy change reduced the probability that
tasers would be deployed in use-of-force encounters during the post-change study period.
These conclusions support the finding that the change in organizational policy relating to
placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force Continuum has achieved the desired effect of
increased safety to citizens. By increasing the level of suspect resistance required to authorize
taser deployment, the frequency of taser use declined. This finding would seem to be supported
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by the theory of value balancing as advanced by Thacher and Rein (2004). The net effect of this
change may be increased saftey for the public by reducing taser use without significantly
increasing risk to officers.

Summary
After an analysis of the archival data, the findings suggest that after the policy change
that raised the authorized level on the Use-of-Force Continuum for deploying taser, the
frequency of taser use by officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered
by officers after the policy change increased. The analysis of suspect injuries revealed no change
in either the frequency or severity of injuries to suspects after the policy change. The frequency
of injuries to officers also did not increase after the policy change.
Survey response data from officers revealed that, while officers perceive an increased
risk of harm to themselves as a result of the organizational policy change, they did not perceive
an increased risk of harm to suspects. Officers expressed a belief that the organizational change
is appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. Given the existing literature on police culture
and behavior, this finding is unexpected and compelling. As prior research has revealed, police
officers do not universally accept organizational policy changes (Crank and Langworthy 1992;
Lingamneni, 1979). Officers have demonstrated a particular aversion to specific policy changes
that limit the use of police discretion. This research study’s findings would seem to contradict
this conventional finding and lend support to the premise that officers will accept some forms of
change when practical experience and application are factored into the formation of their
perceptions.
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Comparing archival data findings and the officer survey responses yielded an interesting
finding. The analysis of archival data depicts no change in the frequency or severity of injuries to
suspects as result of the policy change. There was no statistically significant increase in the
frequency of injuries to officers after the policy change. Survey responses from officers reveal a
belief that the policy change that altered the placement of the taser on the Use-of-Force
Continuum increases their risk of injury. However, this belief is not supported by the findings
from the analysis of the archival data. These beliefs may emphasize a level of frustration on the
part of officers, who perceive the policy change as limiting their discretion, and this limitation
may be seen by officers as weakening their ability to act promptly and decisively in a use-offorce encounter.
The analysis of archival data reveals that the severity of injuries to suspects after the
policy change did not change. Officer survey responses also indicate a perception that there is no
increased risk of injury to suspects from the change in policy. It appears that the officers’
perceptions that there is no increased risk to suspects as a result of the policy change are
supported by the archival data.

Methodological Limitations
This research study produced a number of relevant findings relating to organizational
policy change and taser use. This study uses methods of acquiring data through research of
related literature, examination of use-of-force documentation, review of related agency
documents, and analysis of officer survey responses. However, several limitations and
methodological shortcomings were apparent in this study. This method of analysis is limited in
the following ways:
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This research study is limited to the use of taser weapons by a single police agency.
Because a single police agency was used for analysis, some aspects of this research may not be
generalizable to the greater law enforcement population. Every effort was made to insure that
OPD was in fact representative of other mid size police agencies.
The OPD’s policies and practices regarding deployment of taser weapons are unique to
their organization, and they may also alter the way the data was interpreted. Certain terminology
and formatting had to be generalized to correspond with more mainstream use-of-force terms and
context. This was only done to add clarity and to inform the reader.
Data related to the injuries to suspects relied on the accurate documentation of the
injuries by the investigating police supervisor. The level of detail as to the extent and description
of injuries can be subjective and difficult to categorize. No details were provided as to the
severity of injuries to officers on the use-of-force forms. Every effort was made to maintain
consistency in recording the responses related to the extent of injury recorded on the use-of-force
form, however, this is largely based on the observations of the reporting officer.
The use of self-reported data by officers in use-of-force incidents can lead to
exaggeration of certain aspects of an event, such as the level of resistance exhibited by the
suspect or accurately describing the injuries to a suspect during an encounter. This limitation has
been noted in previous studies that use archival use-of-force data.
Similarly, the categorizing of incident types for the levels of resistance encountered and
for the seriousness of the threat encountered relied on accurate descriptions and categorizing of
the incidents that led to the use-of-force incident. Every effort was made to consistently
document and classify these data.
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For the survey research portion of the study, the principal limitation was the low response
rate to the survey instrument. The response rate for the electronic survey was 39%, or 130
respondents out of 333 who were contacted and invited to participate. While this response rate
was deemed acceptable, a larger response rate would be more desirable and add rigor to the
study findings and conclusions. It is unclear exactly why the officer response rate was low. One
can speculate that officers are reluctant to state their opinions about such a controversial topic. It
could also be that officers feel that their use-of-force incidents already are scrutinized by the
public and commanders, so why should they add to the debate by stating their opinions, which
may be in conflict with agency policies and further reduce their discretion in use-of-force
incidents.
The effect of the public controversy and the associated media reports that preceded the
change in policy at OPD cannot be ignored. It is impossible to accurately measure the effect that
this may have had on the frequency of taser use by officers during the identified analysis periods.
The survey response data indicates awareness by officers of the public controversy and a finding
that they believe that the change places taser use appropriately on the Use-of-Force Continuum
for most encounters. The inability to measure the effect of this scrutiny on taser deployments in
the archival data analysis remains a limitation of this research.

Recommendations for Further Research
Based on the findings and conclusions of this research study, the following
recommendations are offered:
The replication of this research study using a larger sample, longer time frame, or
multiple police agencies could yield additional valuable data and findings. These study options
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would also increase generalizability, allowing for application to a larger law enforcement
population. It would also be valuable to solicit the opinions of suspects and the general
population regarding being exposed to tasers or witnessing someone being exposed to the taser in
a use-of-force incident. This might provide valuable insight and further explicate the use of
police tactics from the perspective of offenders as well as the general public observing such
incidents.
Additional studies could also be conducted that incorporate the use of chemical spray or
impact weapons and organizational policy changes. These findings could be compared and
analyzed for changes in outcomes or effectiveness. These studies could potentially yield valuable
findings and add to the growing body of research on police use-of-force in general.
Applying this study template to other types of organizational policy changes, such as
policies governing vehicle pursuit, police tactics, or deadly force issues, to evaluate positive
outcomes or effectiveness could provide useful data. This type of research could yield valuable
data to guide police decision makers when contemplating changes to policy and procedures
related to high liability areas, such as use-of-force and vehicle pursuit.
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RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE CONTINUUM
ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUSPECT’S RESISTANCE

EMPLOYEE’S RESPONSE

LEVEL I – INDICATORS OF RESISTANCE
Non-verbal cues indicating subject’s
demeanor and attitude coupled with an
apparent readiness to resist.

EMPLOYEE’S PRESENCE
The employee’s attitude and demeanor
and their lawful right to be where they
are.

LEVEL II – VERBAL RESISTANCE
The subject’s verbal responses indicating
non-compliance and unwillingness to
cooperate

VERBAL DIRECTIONS
The employee’s verbal communications
that specifically direct the actions of the
subject and offer the opportunity for
compliance.

LEVEL III – PASSIVE RESISTANCE
The subject fails to obey verbal direction
preventing the member from taking lawful
action.

SOFT CONTROL
The employee applies techniques that
have a minimal potential for injury to the
subject, if the subject resists the
technique.

LEVEL IV – ACTIVE RESISTANCE
The subject’s actions are intended to
facilitate an escape or prevent an arrest.
The action is not likely to cause injury.

HARD CONTROL
The member applies techniques that
could result in greater injury to the
subject, if the subject resists their
application by the member.

LEVEL V – AGGRESSIVE RESISTANCE
The subject has battered, or is about to
batter a person/member and the subject’s
action is likely to cause injury.

INTENSIFIED TECHNIQUES
Those techniques necessary to overcome
the actions of the subject, short of deadly
force. If the subject resists or continues to
resist these techniques there is a strong
probability of injury being incurred by the
subject.

LEVEL VI – DEADLY FORCE RESISTANCE
The subject’s actions are likely to cause
death or great bodily harm to the member
or another person

DEADLY FORCE
Member’s actions may result in death or
great bodily harm to the subject.
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RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE CONTINUUM (TECHNIQUE GUIDELINES)
ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT
EMPLOYEE’S
PRESENCE
VERBAL
DIRECTIONS
SOFT CONTROL
TECHNIQUES

HARD CONTROL
TECHNIQUES

INTENSIFIED
TECHNIQUES
DEADLY FORCE

♦ Lawful presence
♦ Attitude and demeanor
♦ Identification of authority
♦ Commands to direct subject action
♦ Notification of arrest
♦ Opportunity to comply
♦ Techniques having minimal potential of injury if resisted by a
subject
o Pressure points
o Wrist locks
o Arm bars
o Compression techniques
o Chemical agents
♦ Techniques having a greater potential of injury if resisted by a
subject
o Forearm/knee/open and closed hand strikes
o Strikes with the baton
o Kicks
o Takedowns
o Head locks
o Impact weapons
o Tire deflation devices
o Electronic control devices (TASER)
♦ Techniques necessary to overcome actions of a subject short of
deadly force.
♦ Techniques that may result in death or great bodily harm to the
subject
♦ The application of deadly force is not limited to the use of a
firearm, and may include application of other techniques and/or
weapons.

EMPLOYEE/SUBJECT FACTORS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
EMPLOYEE/SUBJECT FACTORS
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES:
TO BE CONSIDERED:
• Mental incapacity
• Close proximity to firearm or weapon
• Age
• Special knowledge
• Sex
• Injury or exhaustion (member/suspect)
• Size
• Disability
• Skill level
• Imminent danger
• Multiple subjects or
• Availability of weapons
employees
• Arrestee’s level of agitation
• Alcohol/drug influence
• Arrestee handcuffed
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ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT

DEFENSIVE TACTICS FORM
NOTE: FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY – UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL THIS FORM BE FILED IN
CENTRAL RECORDS.
TO:
CHIEF OF POLICE
Complaint #
ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Sector:
District #:
FROM:
Grid #:
Name

Employee #

INVOLVED EMPLOYEE’S SECTION MANAGER:
1.

Incident Location:

2.

Time Supervisor Notified:

Date:
On Scene:

Time:
Other:

Name of Manager Notified:

Time Notified

Type Incident:
3.

Offense Charged:

Offender #1 Name:
A
B.
C.

Race
Sex
DOB
Height
Address
City
Physical condition prior to incident (i.e., intoxication, prior injuries):

D.
E.

Subsequent apparent injuries:
Photographs of injuries:
Digital Image
None taken
Why?
Medical treatment of offender:
Yes
If Yes, where?
Date:

F.

Weight
State

35 mm
No

Refused
By whom?
Time:

Offender #2 Name:
A.
B.
C.

Race
Sex
DOB
Height
Address
City
Physical condition prior to incident (i.e., intoxication, prior injuries):

D.
E.

Subsequent apparent injuries:
Photographs of injuries:
35 mm
None taken
Why?
Medical treatment of offender: Yes
If Yes, where?
Date:

F.

Digital Image
No
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Refused
By whom?
Time:

Weight
State

4.

Employees involved:

# Battered:

# Injured:

List principal employees in order of their degree of physical involvement:
Note: For the purposes of this policy and procedure, a principal employee is: “Any employee who encounters
physical resistance from a subject and must use greater force than controlling techniques or restraint holds to
overcome it.”
Name

R/S

DOH

Age

Employee #

A.
B.
C.
D.

Attach copy of Charging Affidavit and/or Incident Report
5.

Implements used by employees:
ECD
TASER
Cartridge #

Chemical
Agents

Impact
Weapon

K-9

Stop Sticks/
Tire Deflation
Device

Specify Implement and Explain
Employee’s Involvement

A.
B.
C.
D.
6.

Physical technique used by employees.
Tackle / Take
Down

Hands

Other

Specify Technique and Explain Employee’s Involvement

A.
B.
C.
D.
7.

List assisting employees and their physical involvement:
Name

Employee #

Involvement

Name

Address

Phone #

A.
B.
C.
D.
8.

Witnesses

A.
B.
C.
D.
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Defensive Tactics Form - Continued
SUPERVISOR’S NARRATIVE (Include [1] general circumstances; [2] specific resistance encountered; [3] physical
techniques utilized; [4] extent of injuries incurred; [5] who incurred and inflicted the injuries; [6] statement of
witnesses; [7] when applicable, appropriate manager was notified, [8] supervisor’s endorsement; and, [9] a
statement whether the force used was in keeping with policy.)

Approve

Disapprove
(Attach Dissent)
Date

Reporting Supervisor
Technique/Tactic Used

Date

Training Supervisor
Date
Training Section Cmdr.
Date
Employee’s Supervisor
(If different than reporting supervisor)

Date
Section Commander
Date
Division Commander
Date
Bureau Commander
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